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COMMENTARY ON THE DECREE "QUEMADMODUM."

THE Decree "*Quemadmodum*" was promulgated the 17th Dec., 1890, in order to suppress abuses that had arisen in certain religious communities. It is our purpose to make a few notes and remarks on its bearings and meaning, and solve some difficulties that may arise as to its interpretation. In doing so we shall present the text by paragraphs, making use of the official translation sent by our Ordinaries to the superiors of those religious communities that are concerned with it. The text of the Decree is italicised.

Just as it is the fate of human things, how praiseworthy and holy soever they may be in themselves, even so is it of laws wisely enacted, to be liable to be misused and perverted to purposes opposed and foreign to their nature. Wherefore it sometimes happens that they no longer serve the purpose which the lawmakers had in view; nay, they sometimes even produce quite a contrary result.

1. In this first paragraph a general reason for the promulgation of the Decree is presented, and the mind is prepared for its dutiful acceptance. Moreover, an objection which would seem to present itself most readily to us is anticipated; for we are reminded that experience teaches us that what has been established for the general good is very often turned to evil. Consequently, what had been wisely sanctioned or granted by the supreme authority is now pru-

dently taken away, and that, too, without the least suspicion of contradiction or fickleness. Therefore there is no question here of a law, new in all its bearings, but only of certain arrangements and limitations for suppressing the abuses that have evidently crept in, and of restoring to usefulness what has become fraught with danger.

Much it is to be deplored that such has proved to be the case with the laws of several Congregations, Societies, and Institutes, both of women who emit simple or solemn vows, and of men who by their profession and discipline are merely laymen. For, inasmuch as occasionally their Constitutions permitted the making a manifestation of conscience, in order that thereby the members might the more easily learn, in their doubts, from experienced Superiors, how to walk in the path of perfection, it has happened, on the contrary, that some of the latter have introduced the practice of thoroughly inquiring into the state of their subjects' conscience, which is a thing reserved exclusively to the Sacrament of Penance. In like manner, and in conformity with the prescriptions of the Sacred Canons, it was ordered that Sacramental Confession in all such communities should be made to the respective Ordinary and Extraordinary Confessors; while, on the other hand, the arbitrary conduct of some Superiors has gone so far as to refuse to their subjects an Extraordinary Confessor, even in cases where the conscience of the persons so refused stood greatly in need of such privilege. These Superiors were given a rule of discretion and prudence for the purpose of enabling them to direct their subjects in a proper and right use of peculiar penitential exercises and other practices of piety; but this very rule, also, was so perverted by abuse that they [the Superiors] took it on themselves to permit, at their pleasure, their subjects to approach the Holy Table, or even sometimes to forbid them Communion altogether. Hence it has happened that such regulations as these, established for the salutary and wise purpose of promotiug the spiritual progress of members and fostering in communities the union growing out of peace and concord, have not unfrequently resulted in imperilling the salvation of souls, in deeply disturbing consciences, and, moreover, in the disturbance of exterior peace,—as it is most evidently proved by the appeals and complaints frequently made to the Holy See.

2. Here we come more closely to the object of the Decree; and, the points in particular, to which the abuses that are to be corrected tend, are laid before us.

These points are three—*a*, the manifestation of conscience; *b*, the recourse to Extraordinary Confessors; and *c*, the frequency of Holy Communion. A few words on each.

a.—Manifestation of conscience, which is called in other places in this Decree "a close searching of the conscience," "an intimate manifestation of heart and conscience," is described by Father Lehmkuhl, in his annotations on this Decree as "a communication made to a Superior, of the thoughts and affections, temptations and interior struggles of one's soul." Father S. Franco, S. J., in a letter to a certain Superioress, a letter which is a full and excellent commentary on the Decree itself, expresses the same opinion; for he says that "by manifestation of conscience, such as is commonly understood in religious communities, is meant a knowledge of the state of one's soul, imparted by a subject to a Superior, not indeed freely or voluntarily, but because the rule obliges it, and so given that one's dispositions and desires for doing good, the obstacles and difficulties met with, the passions and temptations which move or harass the soul, the faults that are more frequently committed, are sincerely and unreservedly made known."

That this and no other manifestation of conscience is the object of this Decree is evident, not only from the very tenor of the words, but from the reason which is added; namely, on account of the abuses and dangers which arise from it; the abuses, we know, come from the arbitrary severity exercised by some Superiors; the dangers from this, that women and lay-persons undertake to manage matters that belong strictly to the Sacrament of Penance, and meddle in the business of Confessors.

Wherefore with respect to the manifestation of one's exterior actions nothing is changed. Superiors still have the right to inquire about external faults that they may take measures against the guilty, so too Masters and Mistresses of Novices may inquire strictly if their instructions on the different works of piety and the exercises of spiritual life were rightly understood. But here I must confess that as far as my own knowledge goes hardly anything else but this is the custom in the convents of this country. And yet far be it from us to infer that the Decree exaggerates, or that on the other hand there is no need to be solicitous on this very point. Who imagines for a moment that all these abuses, at which the Decree hints, have place in each and every religious community, or in this particular section of our Lord's vineyard? But we cannot close our eyes to that open fact of poor human nature, to that

inborn curiosity, I mean, which has such a strong hold on all, and on women especially, to that more than solicitous anxiety they have to know everything and to inquire after a great deal beyond.

b.—With respect to an Extraordinary Confessor, we know that one is not only allowed but even required by the laws of the Church for those religious who live under rule, and this for the purpose of more effectively preserving liberty of conscience. Recourse to him may be considered as a necessary consequence of that law by reason of which not all Confessors, but only those specially appointed, can validly and licitly hear the confessions of nuns and of religious in general.

On this point two essentials may be noted: the first is that nuns should have a special and suitable Confessor who can lead them safely and prudently on the way to perfection; the other, that this seeming restriction should not degenerate into absolute subjection, that so the danger of sacrilege or despair may be avoided. To this two-fold necessity corresponds the two-fold head of ecclesiastical legislation, in consequence of which both the Ordinary Confessor of nuns ought to be specially approved, and besides an Extraordinary Confessor offered to them several times during the year.

These provisions, which were sanctioned by the Council of Trent, sess. 25, De Reg. c. x.; and by many Roman Pontiffs, especially by Gregory XV. and Clement X., were, with even more explicitness, confirmed and impressed by Benedict XIV. in the Bull "*Pastoralis Curae*," August 5, 1748. In it that Holy Pontiff complains of the rigorous severity which some Prelates and Superiors use in granting Extraordinary Confessors. This same severity is the reason for the fatherly complaint of Leo XIII.; and the very thing that once for all should be crushed is this abuse of power.

Here perhaps it may be asked whether this point of the Decree has any practical application in this country; and the reason for the question is that here with us, with very few exceptions, we have no nuns in the strict sense, such as were meant by the Council of Trent and by Benedict XIV. And yet the Decree does apply to us, because, from the very words of the Pontiff, the privilege of having recourse to an Extraordinary Confessor should be conceded to all those religious to whom the Decree is directed, and the Decree is directed to all congregations, societies, and institutes of women and merely lay-men, and that independently of the kind of vows they make, whether they be simple or solemn. But apart from this is it true that the legislation enacted by Trent and by Benedict XIV. has

no application to our nuns for the reason that, for the most part, they are not such in the strict sense, that is, according to the strict standard of canon law? Such would indeed be the case, if we are to understand that this legislation was not *made* for them; but not, if we think that the legislation is not *applicable* and, in fact, *applied* to them. Not only the statutes of the two last Councils of Baltimore require this application, but also the intention of the Church, frequently made known to us in these later days, and, besides, a parallel reason; for when once the law of having one Special Confessor has been admitted, the liberty of having recourse to an Extraordinary Confessor must follow as a consequence. Before me are the words of the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore, n. 96: "And with regard to the Sisters who make only simple vows, our Bishops should not neglect to follow out the prescription of Holy Church which provides not only for an Ordinary Confessor appointed by the Ordinary or other Superiors, but also that an Extraordinary one should be delegated several times during the year. Reason itself and the Rules and the practice of these new Institutes approved and commended by the Apostolic See, demand both."

There is, however, one case in which this obligation of providing for an Extraordinary Confessor ceases. It is when, in any diocese, whether from the expressed or tacit consent of the Ordinary, nuns have permission to go to any Confessor as they please; and though an Ordinary Confessor has been named for them, he is not considered as one who alone can validly and licitly hear their confessions, but only because they can go to him with more freedom and convenience.

c.—The third abuse the Holy Father complains of, is that some Superiors of these several congregations and institutes have taken upon themselves to decide who, among their subjects, may go more frequently, and who more rarely, to Holy Communion.

Now decisions like these belong to the tribunal of the soul, over which the Confessor alone is judge, and so it is easy to see how unauthorized is such a manner of acting, how liable to abuse and danger.

The Holy See through different Congregations has often made known its mind on this very subject as well as on that which relates to the manifestation of conscience. Passing over those more ancient decrees I mention now but two of more recent date. And first we have a reply given by the S. Poenitentiaria on the 19th of November, 1885. It was asked, "to whom it belonged to allow nuns to go

more frequently to Holy Communion," and the answer was, "it belongs to Confessors to grant permission to individuals, according to the rules laid down by approved authors, and especially by St. Alphonsus Liguori."

Again when the S. Congr. Conc. was asked concerning the meaning in which the statutes of religious communities were approved, statutes that constitute certain days as Communion-days for all, the S. Congr. on the 4th of August, 1888, answered that "the faculty of going frequently to Holy Communion must be left, with the right of denying it, to the judgment of the Confessor, independent of the consent of the Superior or Superioress."

Wherefore our Most Holy Father, Leo XIII., impelled by the peculiar solicitude for which he is distinguished toward this most select portion of his flock, in the audience which he gave me, the Cardinal-Prefect of the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, on the 14th day of December, 1890, after carefully and diligently considering everything, has willed, determined, and decreed as follows:

3. From these words we can clearly conclude how great is the judicial authority of the Decree, what too is the force of its obligation. True, many are the opinions of Canonists on the value of force of decisions, declarations, and answers coming from the Congregations of Rome, and to arrive at the truth in those questions we must have in mind many nice points and fine distinctions. But there is no question whatever about this, the supreme judicial force I mean, of any document bringing with it a new and general law, and which we know, by some Congregation, to have come to us from the hand of the Holy Father. The reason is given by Lehmkuhl, namely, that since the Roman Congregations have not by their own right legislative power, it follows that if ever they do formulate a true law, as in the case we are now dealing with, it is not the Congregation that acts, properly speaking, but the Holy Father himself, who, in the exercise of his supreme power, makes use of the same Congregation as a means to promulgate it. The binding power of this Decree is then the greatest; to disobey it would be a sin.

His Holiness annuls, abrogates, and declares of no force whatever, hereafter, all regulations whatsoever in the Constitutions of

Pious Societies and Institutes of women who emit either simple or solemn vows, as well as in those of men of the purely lay order (even though the said constitutions should have received from the Holy See approbation in any form soever, even that which is termed most special), in this one point, in which these Constitutions regard the secret manifestation of conscience in whatsoever manner or under what name soever. He therefore seriously enjoins on all the Superiors, Male and Female, of such Institutes, Congregations, and Societies to absolutely cancel and expunge altogether from their respective Constitutions, Directories, and Manuals all the aforesaid regulations. Likewise he declares whatsoever usages and customs in this matter, even such as are from time out of mind, to be null and void and to be abolished.

4 In this part of the Decree three things must be noted—*a*, the statute ; *b*, the precept ; *c*, who they are, to whom statute and precept apply. We will touch these three points briefly :

a.—The statute consists in this—that the Pope in the fulness of his power takes away from the rules and constitutions of the religious, to be specified below, any approbation ever given with regard to the manifestation of heart and conscience. The effect of the Pope's will is that whatever has been written on this subject now becomes a dead letter, whatever custom has established ceases to be. Consequently, though no precepts were given, from this statute alone it would follow, that a Superior who should exact such an account of conscience would act arbitrarily, and the subject who should refuse to make such a manifestation, would be guilty of no fault.

We must notice also that the force and extension of this law reaches not only to the repealing of any approbation given in specific form, which embraces any special approbation given spontaneously, from certain knowledge and personally by the Roman Pontiff himself, but, that it also embraces the annulment of any law whatsoever, even unwritten and coming from long established customs.

b.—It would seem that the above enactment would suffice of itself to gain the end in view. But, because human nature like history, repeats itself, and to avoid any danger of the old abuses cropping up again, the Holy Father admonishes all whom it concerns to cut out from their rules, constitutions and directories whatever refers to or in any way whatever explains this same manifesta-

tion of conscience. This eradication may be done in many ways, provided it be thorough and effective. And at the same time it is clear that this is the duty not of each and every Superior, but only of those higher ones who have the charge and care of the whole congregation or institute.

c.—And now we must enquire who are the religious to whom this law and precept apply? No doubt, nor difficulty, with respect to women can present itself. It is clearly stated that the law binds all institutes and all congregations of women, no matter whether their vows be simple or solemn. But the case of men is not so evident. For it is so expressed, "that these only are bound by the law who are of the *purely lay-order*, or who by their profession and dicipline are merely *lay-men*."

Let us see now which are the religious communities of men, so called.

According to Canon Law a *lay-man* is so styled in distinction to a cleric; consequently, men of the *purely lay-order* are those who do not receive even the first tonsure; consequently, again, those congregations of men are here meant from whom the clerical state is excluded, either by their profession or discipline; such are, for instance, the Christian Brothers.

But a difficulty comes from the letter which Cardinal Verga, Prefect of the Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, sent to all the Metropolitans when he published this very Decree. In that letter, it is said, that "only those institutes of men are excepted, which, by nature and rule, are purely ecclesiastical." These words certainly have a wider meaning than those of the Decree, for they seem to embrace even those institutes in which non-clerics are admitted as members; these institutes may perhaps be said, at least in some sense, not to be *purely*, that is in all their members, *ecclesiastical*. The point at issue was brought to the Congr. Ep. et Reg. The doubt stated thus: "Whether the Decree comprised, besides the institutes of women, only those institutes of men of purely lay character as the Brothers of the Christian Schools, etc., or embraces also ecclesiastical congregations like the Salesians, founded by Don Bosco, the Rosminians, Lazzarists and the like, in which, besides Priests, many lay brothers are numbered?" The Cong., on the 15th of April, 1891, answered *affirmatively* to the first part, *negatively* to the second.

He, moreover, forbids absolutely such Superiors, male and female, no matter what may be their rank and eminence, from endeavoring,

directly or indirectly, by command, counsel, fear, threats, or blandishments, to induce their subjects to make to them any such manifestation of conscience; and he commands these subjects on their part to denounce to the higher Superiors such as dare to induce them to make such manifestation; and if the guilty one be the Superior-General the denunciation should by them be made to this Sacred Congregation.

5. The precept mentioned in the preceding paragraph would lose its efficacy and fall short of its object were it not supplemented by another. For it is not beyond the range of possibility that some Superiors, whilst acknowledging that they have no right to oblige their subjects to an account of conscience, might nevertheless, by means of blandishments, or by counsel and exhortation, draw their subjects to a full manifestation of their interior. Such subtle ingenuity had to be guarded against by a new precept which carries with it its own sanction. And so in this paragraph two other precepts are imposed: one absolute, prohibiting any recourse to blandishments, counsels and the like; the other hypothetical, commanding that those Superiors who are guilty of such conduct be denounced to the proper authorities. The first precept applies to all Superiors no matter what may be their rank and eminence; the second is directed to inferiors. Both may be called, and in point of fact are, auxiliary precepts; for just as the precept which binds one to denounce Superiors is given to sanction and confirm the one which forbids all use of persuasive arts, of coaxing or urgent counsel, so the other which binds Superiors is imposed to concur with the one mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the object of which is the total abolition of the manifestations of conscience.

If it were asked whether both oblige under pain of mortal sin I would answer that, beyond all doubt, the first does; so that those Superiors who have recourse to these counsels and blandishments to gain their end sin grievously. And the reason is drawn not only from the very tenor of the words, especially from that term, "*districte*," that is, *severely*, *absolutely*, but also from the serious penalty imposed; for to be denounced for punishment is certainly not a light thing, but something very serious; and, besides all this, we must consider also the very matter of the precept and the end in view and draw our conclusions from both; for if this precept had not been imposed the whole force and efficacy of the Decree itself would be weakened and in a very short time would be utterly destroyed.

On the other hand, however, I would say that the precept obliging inferiors to denounce the guilty Superiors does not bind under pain of grievous sin, although Father Lehmkuhl says that its violation ought to be deemed a sin *grave ex genere suo*, that is, mortal of itself, but whose matter admits of extenuating circumstances, in consideration of which the sin may or may not remain mortal.

For my part I advance my opinion, because among the reasons brought to support this particular precept I cannot find even one that is ordinarily assigned by theologians as indicative of the gravity of the obligation.

This, however, in nowise hinders subjects from freely and of their own accord opening their hearts to their Superiors, for the purpose of obtaining from their prudence, counsel and direction, in doubts and perplexities, in order to aid them in acquiring virtues and advancing in perfection.

6. In this part of the Decree we have an explicit statement of what could be already inferred, namely, the right and lawfulness of that particular manifestation which is called "amicable," which might be made by reason of intimate friendship and confidence. Consequently, inferiors can still lay open the state of their souls to Superiors and seek from their prudence consolation and direction.

All suggestions to this, all counsels from Superiors and exhortations with this in view, must be avoided; because in that case such a manifestation would cease to be given *freely* and, consequently, would by no means be confidential. In a word, it is strictly required that the manifestation should be given by inferiors "*freely*" and "*of their own accord.*"

Another restriction, which, though not expressed, is certainly understood, is to abstain, whilst manifesting doubts and perplexities of soul, from such frailties of our fallen nature as are so naturally connected with danger and shame that they should be manifested only to the Confessor in the sacred privacy of the tribunal of Penance.

But besides these two conditions, namely, that this manifestation of conscience should be voluntary and unasked, and not touching upon the vow of chastity, is there not another condition required? Is not that which is permitted in this paragraph so to be understood that it may fully agree with that clause so often, even in our own

times, affixed by the Sacred Congregation to the approbation of the rules of nuns, namely, that one may freely manifest her conscience but only in regard to her progress in the acquisition of virtues and perfection?

To this I answer that there is no foundation whatever for such an interpretation; because "to lay open the soul in doubts and perplexities," means a great deal more than "to tell how much progress each one is making." Even before the promulgation of this Decree many were of the opinion that "progress in virtue" signified "the internal difficulties of the soul." But now, as F. Lehmkuhl says, "there is no longer any question of *opinion* in this matter, since the words of the Decree are so expressive, by which this manifestation of one's progress in virtue is permitted to subjects according to their own discretion."

Moreover, while the prescriptions of the Holy Council of Trent, Sess. 25, Cap. 10, de Regul., retain their full vigor, as well as the decrees of Benedict XIV. of holy memory in the Constitution Pastoralis Curæ, His Holiness admonishes Prelates and Superiors not to deny their subjects an Extraordinary Confessor as often as the need of their conscience requires it, and without seeking to find out in any way the reason why their subjects make such a demand, or without showing that they resent it. And, lest so provident a disposition as this should be made illusory, he exhorts the Ordinaries to name, in all localities of their dioceses, in which there are communities of women, well-qualified priests with the necessary faculties, to whom such Religious may easily have recourse to receive the Sacrament of Penance.

7. In this paragraph there are four points: 1. The injunction of Trent and that of Benedict XIV. about the Ordinary and Extraordinary Confessors of nuns are confirmed, or rather, as such, are taken for granted. 2. "*Prelates*," that is to say Bishops or the Ordinaries of the places and "*Superiors*," by whom are meant the local or General Superiors, are admonished not to deny an Extraordinary Confessor to their subjects. This admonition applies to the Prelates in granting the necessary faculties: to Superiors where they would prevent recourse to the Confessor as often as he is reasonably called for. 3. These same Superiors are warned not to inquire into the reason why an Extraordinary Confessor is requested. 4. The Bishops are exhorted to appoint suitable priests and to grant them

all faculties that the nuns may have easy recourse to one of them as to an Extraordinary Confessor.

On each of these points a few words must be added in explanation.

a.—The words of Trent that refer to the Extraordinary Confessors of nuns are the following: "Besides the Ordinary one an Extraordinary Confessor shall be appointed twice or three times during the year who ought to hear the confessions of all."

At first sight a difficulty arises from these very words, for they seem to impose an obligation rather than grant a privilege. But Benedict XIV. explains their meaning to be that the Extraordinary Confessor must hear the confessions of only those nuns who wish to confess to him. They are not, however, obliged to make a confession to him, although each and every one is bound to present herself before him to receive spiritual advice and direction.

b.—With regard to the caution given to Prelates and Superiors not to deny an Extraordinary Confessor to their subjects as often as the needs of their conscience require one, we must remark that the sense does not seem to be that Superiors must have positive knowledge of that existing need of their subjects, because this would imply that they should know why the Extraordinary Confessor is asked for, an inquiry which they are by no means allowed to make. The meaning, therefore, seems to be this: taking it for granted that the request is reasonable, which must always be done according to that rule of canon law that no one is to be deemed guilty unless evident facts prove him to be so, then the Extraordinary Confessor ought to be granted in all those cases in which there is no right to suppose that the request is unreasonable. And if it were asked when or how we can be sure of the propriety of the demand, we answer that this is a judgment that depends entirely on circumstances, due allowance made for the persons asking, their manner, and above all for the greater or less frequency of their entreaties.

c.—The prohibition that stops all inquiry into the reasons why the Extraordinary Confessor is called for is a dictate of the natural law. Such prying curiosity is of itself sinful, and perhaps these are the reasons why the caution is not expressed in more sharp and more solemn words. Such inquisitiveness would soon sound the depths of the soul and would fetter and destroy all liberty. And this brings us face to face with the very abuses and disorders which the Holy Father wishes to crush out of existence by the present Decree. Therefore such over-curious questioning is of itself a serious

fault, and only from mitigating circumstances could it be considered a light one.

d.—In the exhortation given to Ordinaries for the appointment of *suitable priests* we notice the plural is used, that so the privilege of having recourse to an Extraordinary Confessor when necessary, may meet with no difficulty. The intention of the Holy Father is that there should be, if possible, not one but several priests having faculties for each community; and this provision should not be confounded with the admonition given above to *Prelates* not to deny Extraordinary Confessors, for that caution comes from necessity and is made against any actual request of any nun in particular, whilst the measure now before us provides for a privilege and anticipates any contingency of the community.

As to what regards either permission or prohibition to receive Holy Communion, His Holiness also decrees that such permission or prohibition belongs solely to the Ordinary or Extraordinary Confessor, the Superiors having no right whatever to interfere in the matter, save only the case in which any one of their subjects had given scandal to the community since his or her last confession, or had been guilty of some grievous public fault, and this only until the guilty one had once more received the Sacrament of Penance.

8. Almost all that is contained in this and the following sections relative to going to Holy Communion may be said to belong already to common law; but here we have a forcible and solemn statement of the fact.

In note No. 3 (*c.*) I cited certain documents, but there yet remain many answers and decrees of Roman Congregations from which we could easily infer even before the promulgation of this Decree that the established rule of common law is that the confessor may give permission to go frequently to Holy Communion, and that the consent of the Superior or Superioress is not necessary, but merely that they should be informed of the matter. There are, however, two points here to which our attention is called. First, that whereas before in particular decrees only the Ordinary Confessor was named as the one who could give this permission, now it may be granted also by the Extraordinary Confessor. Second, that there are cases in which the Superior can prohibit the inferior from going to Holy Communion for a time only, that is until the subject goes to confession again.

This can have place when the inferior has given scandal to the community or is guilty of some serious public fault.

We must now examine more closely into the meaning of this. How are we to understand this little word *or?* Does it connect the two clauses between which it lies, or does it separate them? For if it is taken in the copulative sense, then the scandal and the serious public fault must go hand in hand, and in that case the Superior can forbid the inferior to go to Holy Communion only when the guilty one has scandalized the community by some culpable external misbehavior. But if the *or* is taken in the disjunctive sense, then we would have, strictly speaking, two cases, and Holy Communion would be forbidden, either when some serious external fault had been committed, but not before the community, or when the community has been shocked, seriously shocked, but not necessarily by extraordinary public guilt.

My decided opinion is that this last meaning is the true one; and the reason is, not only that it is the obvious meaning of the conjunction *or* and of the whole sentence, but also that, if we would take the first interpretation, we should have to conclude that the Decree is inaccurate in its wording, that it says more than it intends, for it would have been sufficient, if the first meaning were the true one, to say "if anyone has scandalized the community," without adding "or is guilty of some grievous public fault."

All are hereby admonished to prepare themselves diligently and to approach Holy Communion on the days prescribed in their respective Rules; and when the Confessor may judge conducive to the spiritual advancement of any member to receive more frequently, he may give the needful permission. But whoever receives from the Confessor the permission to receive more frequent or daily Communion is bound to inform the Superior of the same; should the latter think that he has just and serious reasons to oppose such frequent Communion, he is bound to make them known to the Confessor, in whose judgment he must absolutely acquiesce.

9. Excepting the admonition to prepare themselves diligently and to approach Holy Communion on the days prescribed in their respective rules the first part of this section does not pertain to the religious but to their Confessors. To these also belong the exercise of that right with which, as noted in the preceding paragraph, they have been exclusively empowered.

Let these Confessors, then, examine and consider the rules given

by doctors and theologians to guide them in granting frequent or daily Communion. They may be found in the Praxis Confessarii of St. Alphonsus No. 152, and, in the Philothea of St. Francis of Sales, part ii., cap. 20. The scope of these rules and directions is that daily or very frequent Communion is to be granted only to him who besides his ardent desire to receive the Blessed Sacrament has acquired a certain freedom from deliberate venial sins and with earnest manly endeavor is pushing ever onward to greater perfection.

Here I would call the attention of the Confessors to two suggestions. The first is that since there is question now of persons living in community life who are often worried and worn out by all kinds of occupations, due consideration must be had for the numberless distractions and obstacles which arise from these different duties and offices, as well as for all the little jealousies that might arise in the minds of the less privileged ones.

The second suggestion is intended for those who, to say the least, are more than willing to grant daily Communion. They draw a parity from the example of priests who celebrate Mass daily. But the cases are entirely different, and the reason of the disparity is well put by F. Lehmkuhl; for the priest in celebrating Mass is no longer a mere individual, but is invested with a public character and acts for the faithful, and so he is permitted more readily, nay even counseled, to offer the Divine Sacrifice each day, notwithstanding his many imperfections. As a practical rule, if there is question of persons living in community, I would seldom grant Communion on days on which the rule does not prescribe it. More rarely still would I allow daily communicants.

In the second part of this paragraph there is question of the information to be given to Superiors by the subjects who have obtained permission from their Confessors for frequent Communion.

Is this a question of real obligation, and must Superiors be informed each and every time? I think that here we have a case of real obligation, even though it binds but venially, as I argue from the words "is bound," which certainly mean more than a mere direction, and besides, if this information were withheld, not a little disorder and confusion in domestic discipline would follow.

To the second query I answer that it is not necessary to inform Superiors each particular time one obtains permission for an extraordinary Communion, but only when one has been allowed to communicate daily, or, for a certain fixed time, more frequently.

The whole intent and purpose of the words seems to favor this opinion, and besides it was so declared by the Congr. S. Of., 2 July, 1890, with a full approval of the Holy Father; and although this was a declaration made for a particular case, applying to the Confessors of the Sisters of Charity, yet it can, with safety, be taken as a general rule.

On the last part of this paragraph it is well to note that the just and serious reasons which the Superior may have to propose to the Confessor, in opposition to such frequent Communions, can come not only from the general and particular conduct of him who has obtained this permission, but from the general rule and discipline of the house and from any other source that has direct bearing on the individuals or on the whole community. In this I differ from some commentators on this Decree who seem to hold that the just and serious reasons must be drawn only from the conduct of the subject to whom the permission for more frequent Communion has been granted.

His Holiness, furthermore, commands all Superiors General, Provincial and Local Superiors of the Institutes aforementioned, whether of men or of women, to observe zealously and accurately the regulations prescribed in this Decree under pain of incurring ipso facto the penalties decreed against Superiors who violate the mandates of the Holy See.

10. The command that is here given has been hinted at already: now we have its explicit statement and its sanction in ecclesiastical penalties.

A word on the command and its sanction:

a.—The persons who are bound by the regulations of this Decree are of different orders or conditions. We have the Bishops or Ordinaries, the Confessors, the Religious and their Superiors; and yet this particular command is not given to all these persons, but only to Superiors; and we must further notice that this same order does not direct them to take all possible measures for the observance of all the regulations of the Decree, but simply says that "they should observe them;" and this means that the object of the command is merely that Superiors observe such regulations as directly pertain to themselves.

These regulations are reduced to the five following:

1. That Superiors expunge from their rules, be they written or

only sanctioned by custom, whatever bears upon the secret manifestation of conscience.

2. That they never induce their subjects to make such a manifestation, whether by counsel, by threats, by blandishments, or any other such persuasive methods.

3. That they never deny their subjects recourse to an Extraordinary Confessor, when they reasonably ask for one, nor give any sign of displeasure at such a request.

4. That they never in any way inquire into the reason for this demand.

5. That they do not meddle with the permissions or the prohibitions made by the Confessors of their subjects with regard to Holy Communion.

b.—To the question, what are the penalties fixed in sanction of this Decree, some commentators reply that they vary, and are in proportion to the gravity of the transgression; they may be censures, deposition from office, loss of active and passive voice, and whatever else to be determined by the proper authorities.

But I cannot accept this answer, because it is contrary to the very words of the Decree, words which declare that the punishishments are not "*ferendae*," but "*latae sententiae*;" that is, the guilty do not wait for judgment, but incur the penalties by the very violation of the Decree.

I agree, then, with what Fr. Lehmkuhl holds, who quotes the Apostolic Constitutions, "*Officii nostri Debitum*," promulgated by Innoc.VIII, Jan. 25th, 1491, and "*Romanus Pontifex*," published by Clem. VII, Dec. 29th, 1533, by force of which excommunication is incurred by those who impede the execution of Apostolic Letters.

And if this interference is abetted by the support of lay-power, an excommunication is incurred, which is in a special manner reserved to the Pope, in the Con. "*Apost. Sedis*," enacted by Pius IX.

He lastly commands that copies of this present Decree, translated into the vernacular, shall be inserted in the Constitutions of the said pious Institutes, and that at least once in a twelvemonth, at a stated time in each House, either in the public Refectory, or in Chapter assembled for this special purpose, this Decree shall be read in a loud and intelligible voice.

11. What is here ordained refers to the future inviolable ob-

servance of this Decree. These several regulations rightly fulfilled, no plea can be made on the ground of ignorance or desuetude.

And thus hath His Holiness determined and decreed, notwithstanding all things to the contrary, even such as are worthy of special and individual mention.

12. The seal of authority is stamped upon the Decree by these words, and whatever objection might be made against it is anticipated and set aside.

A. SABETTI, S. J.

DEFENCE OF THE "A SIMULTANEO" PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

THE AMERICAN ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW for December, 1891, contained a criticism of an article written by me in the *Catholic Quarterly* of last July, entitled "Proofs of the Existence of God, drawn from the metaphysical or ideal order."

For the benefit of those who did not read the article referred to, it may be well to state here that those proofs were two in number, and were drawn respectively from the human conception of finite essences, and from the idea which created minds have of the Infinite. It was claimed that the demonstrations furnished by these two different *media* were quite as valid and as perfect as any of the *a posteriori* arguments employed by the Philosophers. It was asserted, moreover, that neither of these arguments could be properly classified as an *a posteriori* proof; that they are more correctly denominated *a simultaneo*.

My critic rejects the argument founded on man's idea of the Infinite as sophistical and totally worthless. He admits the demonstrative force of the reasoning based on concepts of finite essences, but objects to my classification of that reasoning; he believes that it is a strictly *a posteriori* argument, and contends that in the effort to establish my thesis I plainly advocate Ontologism and manifest a leaning towards Pantheism.

I shall have to consider first the objections brought against the assertion that the argument drawn from ideal finite essences is not an *a posteriori* but an *a simultaneo* argument. Secondly, I shall

show in what I differ from the school of Ontologists. Thirdly, I shall endeavor to demonstrate that the charge of pantheistic tendencies is groundless and unmerited. Lastly, I shall examine my critic's reply to the metaphysical proof drawn from the idea of the Infinite in the finite mind.

The critic was kind enough to cite the entire passage written by me in support of the assertion that the demonstration of the existence of God from finite essences is justly called an *a simultaneo* demonstration. The paragraph in which he detects Ontologism runs thus:

"Metaphysical essences have no being in themselves, and they exist only in the essence of God, of which they are possible participations. When, therefore, they are expressed by the human mind, it is in truth the divine reality *as participable according to this or that mode which is the object represented.* All metaphysical concepts represent under a created, analogical similitude or image, the being of God as capable of being participated by creatures. It is that, and nothing else, which the intellect manifests when it conceives the nature of man in the abstract, or any other ideal essence."

Now, if it be admitted that our concept of merely possible finite things represents a reality, and that this reality does not exist outside of God, it is perfectly clear that such concepts in some way represent the reality of God. The mere analysis of these conceptions, therefore, leads directly to a cognition of the divine Esse, the ultimate objective reality corresponding to them; and thus, as I concluded before, "in all such conceptions the existence of God is implicitly asserted."

However, "these views," I am told, "are contrary to sound philosophy, ontologistic and false." "What is it according to common sense and sound reason that the finite essences, these possible participations, *i. e.*, partial imitations of God's essence really represent when expressed by the human mind? What does *e. g.*, a horse, tree or stone as conceived by the mind contain and place before the mind's eye? Evidently nothing but the reality, the nature and qualities of a horse, a tree, a stone. It is a horse, a tree, a stone and nothing else that we think and speak of when we have these ideas in our mind and use the corresponding words. And whatever the ideas when reflected upon and analyzed put before our mind as contained in them we accordingly enunciate of their respective objects as in reality identified with them. Hence we form judgments like these: A horse is a quadruped, a tree is a vegetating substance, a stone is lifeless matter. In this manner all men, following their natural rea-

son, understand and use abstract ideas and universal terms. Thus we think and speak of all things we become acquainted with, and we understand at the same time that this is the correct way of thinking and speaking."

If an intelligent student of philosophy were told that a horse, as conceived by the mind, evidently contains and places before the mind's eye nothing but the reality, the nature and qualities of a horse, the following questions would naturally suggest themselves to him: What are the reality, the nature and qualities of a horse? Since there is a question of an ideal horse, not of one actually existing *a parte rei*, what is and where is the objective reality *extra mentem* which corresponds to the ideal in the mind? Is this metaphysical essence something entirely subjective, just as is an *ens rationis*, *e. g.*, the subject of a proposition, or is it something that possesses real entity, objective being? The legitimate curiosity of the tyro would receive but little satisfaction from the profound reply of our critic, to wit: According to common sense and sound reason the aforesaid metaphysical essence or the reality, nature and qualities of a horse are the reality, nature and qualities of a horse and nothing else! The point raised as to the objectivity of such essence and the distinction between it and the *ens rationis* is utterly ignored in this reply. A sensible question is answered by a truism. Can "common sense and sound reason" be invoked to justify such a response?

Quite different was the answer given to these questions in the article in the *Catholic Quarterly*. I there asserted that metaphysical essences are "possible participations of the essence of God;" or in other words meaning precisely the same thing, they are "the divine reality as participable according to this or that mode. They have no being in themselves and exist only in the essence of God. They are possible participations of an actually existent eternal necessary and Immutable Being."

A *possible* being is a being which has no actual existence, but is contained in the power of something that is capable of producing it. Whatever of reality it has, therefore, is found in that "something that is capable of producing it." It is an *effect* not yet produced but contained in a *cause* that can bring it into being. It is denominated *real* merely for the reason that its cause is a real entity. Now every one knows that an effect *as* contained in its cause is one and the same thing as the cause considered reduplicatively as containing that effect. As F. Lepidi puts it, in writing on this very

subject, "effectus in causa est ipsum esse causae praecise sub ea ratione, quatenus causa potest similitudinem sui imprimere in effectu ad extra." Every one admits, moreover, that finite ideal essences are merely possible beings; and that their possibility is eternal, necessary and immutable, not hypothetically but absolutely so. It is evident then that they are unproduced effects contained in an actually existent, eternal, necessary, unchangeable cause, which can be only the essence of the Infinite. It is evident furthermore, that their only being or reality is the being or reality of that Infinite Cause. For these reasons we defined them in our former article: "The Divine Reality as participable according to this or that mode." And I do not claim that I have here presented a new definition of possible beings or finite essences, or that I have even employed any new terminology. P. Vallet, in his Prælectiones Philosophicæ had written before us: "Possibilia nihil aliud sunt nisi variæ res creabiles. Porro variæ res creabiles nihil aliud sunt nisi *divina essentia quatenus secundum varios infinitosque modos a variis creaturis participari potest.*" In his Philosophia Christiana, Lepidi writes thus: "Possibile-ideale, ut in re est, est *divina realitas ut imitabilis ad extra*-vel: Imitabilitas seu participabilitas divinæ realitatis." And he adds immediately: "Quando ergo mens possibile-ideale considerat, et quærit, quæ sit realitas ejus objectiva, *nonnisi divina realitas occurrit ei*; sola quippe realitas Dei potest esse ratio quod esse possibile vere significetur in mente sub nota necessitatis immutabilitatis æternitatis absolutæ."[1]

It is scarcely necessary to add here that these finite effects are not contained formally in the Divine Reality or in the essence of God. The Infinite is not an agglomeration of all the various specific finite essences. It is, on the contrary, one simple substance, undivided and indivisible. It contains, indeed, all the perfections which exist or can exist in creatures, but it contains them *eminently*, not *formally*. That supremely simple *ens*, in virtue of the excellence of its nature and its unlimited perfection, not only is equivalent to, but also excels in an infinite degree each and all of the finite things which exist or can exist. A horse does not exist in God according to its specific formality as a horse, nevertheless all that there is of entity and perfection in the horse exists and from eternity has existed *virtualiter-eminenter* in the infinite essence of the divine Being. Precisely the same is to be said of every other species of creature. The divine Reality is the sole *ratio sufficiens essendi* of them all, and

1. The italics here and in the preceding quotations are mine.

indefinite though they be in number, yet in the supereminent perfection and simplicity of its being it contains them all and in a sense *is* all of them.

I am fully confident that in all that has been said thus far in explanation of the nature of finite essences there is not a single proposition which will not be ratified by every intelligent scholastic philosopher. And in the principles enunciated and defended here we find a complete vindication of the assertion made by me in my previous article to the effect that the proof drawn from those essences is evidently nothing else than an analysis of our ideas of them; in other words, that "in all such conceptions (of finite essences) the existence of God is implicitly asserted." I have shown that when we seek the *reality* manifested by our ideas of metaphysical essences we find it not in these essences themselves—for of themselves they have none—but in the cause which can give them actual being, *i. e.*, in the *Divine Reality;* in the Infinite, Eternal, Immutable, Necessary Being of which they are but possible participations. Therefore every mental conception when it is analyzed is found to contain the assertion that such a cause, such a being, such a reality exists, for the reason given by me in the *Quarterly*. Unless these principles be admitted, Catholic philosophers may cease to philosophize and quietly surrender the field to Kant and the other subjectivists. To quote Lepidi once more: "Qui ergo, divina realitate repudiata, philosophantur sane non sunt philosophi dicendi sed, frivophili."[1]

I now pass to the charges deduced from the theory here enunciated. Most students of philosophy are familiar with the two following propositions: 1. Contra Ontologistas et Pantheistas ostenditur quod ens-finitum-ideale non sit ipsa claritas et realitas Infiniti. 2. Ens-finitum-ideale ut est in re est divina realitas quatenus imitabilis seu participabilis ad extra. It is not difficult to distinguish between the two propositions. In the former the "Divina Realitas" signifies the

1 The texts quoted here from F. Lepidi are taken from a treatise, "De natura entis-possibilis-idealis," in the fourth volume of his Philosophia Christiana. This volume has not been published, but the advanced sheets of it are in my possession. I take special pleasure in quoting this author as confirming the doctrine here enunciated. My critic accuses me of holding a fundamental tenet of Ontologism. I hope to dispose of this charge further on. In the meantime I desire to call attention to the fact that it was F. Lepidi who, in his great work, the *Examen Philosophico-Theologicum*, dealt the death-blow to Ontologism as a philosophic system. It was from the lips of this revered master that I received all my ideas of Philosophy, among them those which we are developing in these pages. Years ago in the works just referred to he wrote the following words: "Habet hæc theoria (Ontologismus) aliquid veri in eo quod asserit, Deum intelligibiliter movere et perficere intellectum creatum, *eumque esse realitatem objectivam, ultimam, fundamentatem omnium intelligibilium idearum.* Atqui negari non potest occasione hujus quæstionis ab Ontologistis motæ rationem objectivam intelligibilem cognitionis *in majori evidentia* fuisse positam."

essence of God precisely as such—*ut est in se*. It denotes, therefore, the Infinite, All-perfect, Simple, Indivisible Being, God as He exists in Himself. In the other it expresses the *imitability*, the *participability* of this Being. It implies consequently this Being precisely as capable of communicating its supereminent perfections to creatures. The object expressed by the term *divina realitas* in the former proposition is one; for there is but one self-subsisting, necessary, Infinite thing. That which it implies in the latter is multiple—as manifold as are the species of possible creatures, or specifically distinct imitabilities of the only self-existent Being.

This distinction having been clearly drawn, let us now see what is the teaching of Ontologists with respect to finite essences and then compare it with my own as put forth in the *Catholic Quarterly* and here defended.

Ontologists affirm that the object represented by the human intellect when it considers metaphysical essences or necessary verities is nothing else than the essence of God as it is in itself. They claim, forsooth, that these essences are identified with the being of God—"ab ente divino reipsa entitative non discrepant."[1]

They contend, moreover, that this being of God is immediately present to the human intellect; that it is the light in which all necessary truths are manifested to the mind. No created image, say they, can represent the Infinite. Consequently, when the mind of man represents the Divine Reality, it does not even produce a *verbum mentis*, but is informed and illumined by the very substance of the Infinite. The Divine Being is not represented to the mind by way of analogy, *i. e.* in some created image only faintly and imperfectly representing it as it is in itself. That Being is so immediately present to the mind, so intimately united with it that it may be truly and strictly said that the mind beholds God's essence intuitively—*facie ad faciem*. All this teaching, gathered from the various works of the adherents of ontologism, is thus aptly expressed by F. Lepidi in his definition of the system:[2]

"Ontologismus est systema in quo asseritur Deum esse immediate et per se praesentem intellectui creato; eique se objicere tanquam lucem intelligibilem et rationem idealem in qua mens naturaliter Deum intuetur ac omnes quascunque videt veritates necessarias, immutabiles, æternas et absolutas."

I distinctly and absolutely reprobate this doctrine; and disavow

1 Branchereau, Psych. page 33.
2 Exam. Philos-Theolog., page 9.

all adherence to this very absurd and unphilosophical system. I deny that the human mind does or can represent naturally the divine Reality *ut est in se*. It does not and can not see intuitively the infinite, all-perfect essence of God. Only in the blest life to come will the *visio facialis* be given to the minds of mortals. Then, but not till then, shall we possess an intuitive knowledge of God. Only then will the divine Essence be immediately present to the cognoscitive faculty of man. I deny, moreover, that necessary truths and ideal essences are identical with the Divinity. Just as I hold that an actually existent creature—though a participation of the divine Esse—is not identified with God, is not God, so do I contend that a possible creature, a participation of God not yet realized, is really distinct from God. For I do not claim that God is a possible participation of Himself; and yet I assert that all finite essences are possible participations of His Entity.

Notwithstanding all that I have stated here, I still claim, of course, that men can and do know God in this life. And when they know God they know the "divine Reality." Because they do not know Him *ut est in se*, it does not follow that they do not know Him at all. They possess that knowledge of Him which is called by the philosophers *cognitio specularis*. They see Him in created analogical images or similitudes. They know Him as a First Cause, as an Eternal Being in which the *rationes omnium rerum* are virtually contained. To know the divine Reality as it is the First Cause is not to know it as it is in itself. I asserted that the human mind knows that divine Reality as virtually containing all things—as participable according to this or that mode,—claiming that this is precisely the ultimate object of the mind when it considers finite essences. And because of this assertion I am accused of holding "a fundamental tenet of ontologism." To know God as He is a cause is to know nothing else than God's power of causing. To know Him "as participable" is to know nothing else than His participability. In both cases the being of God is manifested under a certain peculiar aspect. In neither case is the *Esse Divinum* manifested as it is in itself. From this parallel we must conclude that unless the critic disclaims all knowledge of God in the present life his "views" must be at least as ontologistic as my own.

I come now to the allegation of fostering a tendency to Pantheism. Having quoted my definition of metaphysical essences, my critic proceeds: "Let us apply this canon and see the result. What we find contained in our universal ideas must needs be predicated

of the objects which are represented, being in reality identified with them. Hence, in our case, the attributes of a horse, of a tree, of a stone, are to be predicated of the divine Reality as participable according to this or that mode, and God is therefore, in a certain respect, a quadruped ; in another, a vegetative substance ; in another, lifeless matter. From such language there is only one step to pantheism." This seems to me a very innocent objection. If its author has ever taught a class in ontology, he must have given his students the very reply which I now give here. Why, of course God is, *in a certain respect,* a quadruped, a vegetating substance, and lifeless matter. He is all these things, not formally, indeed, but *virtualiter-eminenter.* He is, in His simplicity, all that there is of perfection in the horse, in the tree, the stone, and every other creature that He can produce. Each of these, when existing *in re,* is not only actually distinct from God, but exists apart—outside of God, so to speak—in its own specific formality. They are all so many distinct participations of the Infinite Being which, remaining in itself always the same immutable, necessary, indivisible *ens,* communicates its perfections in an indefinite number of specific forms. Before they are actually created, they exist only in God, the cause that has the power, the *virtus* necessary to effect them. Their only being while in that state is God's essence precisely as participable according to the specific nature of a tree, a horse, a man. And this is just the reason why I have asserted that in this state they can be known only in as much as the divine Reality is known. For being and intelligibility are correlative. Once these essences have been brought into actuality by God's creative power, they have being in themselves, and therefore have also a certain amount of knowableness, and can be understood—at least, imperfectly—by the human mind, without a simultaneous or coexistent knowledge of the divine Reality. Previous to creation, while in the possible state, they can not be known independently of God's essence, for they exist only in it.

Before proceeding to the objection made against the second ontological proof of the existence of God as stated by me, I will briefly sum up the principles advocated in the foregoing remarks. They are :

1. Metaphysical essences have no being in themselves ; they are possible participations of the divine Being ; their only reality is in God ; and it is, therefore, sheerest nonsense to talk of "metaphysical being" as something *real* apart from, and out side of, God.

2. Since entity and knowableness are correlative, these essences cannot be known except as participabilities of the Infinite.

3. Since the participability of a thing cannot be known unless that thing itself be known, every concept of a metaphysical essence, *when analyzed until its foundation is reached*, explicitly asserts the existence of the Infinite; and therefore all such concepts demonstrate *a simultaneo* the existence of God.

The primary object which I had in view in writing the article for the *Catholic Quarterly* was to set forth, in what I believed to be a new form, the proof of the existence of God drawn from the human mind's idea of the Infinite. My sole purpose in introducing the argument, founded on finite essences, was to show that the two proofs are of precisely the same character, and that while scholastic Philosophers admit the demonstrative force of the latter argument, they are illogical and, as it appears to me, inconsistent in rejecting the former. I claimed then, as now, that the two proofs must stand or fall together, and that to reject either of them is to unite with the Kantian School in denying the objectivity of ideas. I knew of the general prejudice which exists against what has been improperly termed the *a priori* proof of the existence of God, and therefore expected, and even invited, criticism of the manner in which this proof was presented. It was, then, no matter of surprise to me that this demonstration was subjected to adverse criticism; however, I had not believed that the former proof would be selected as the special and chief object of censure.

The proof in question may be thus briefly stated: Entity is the object of all intellectual conceptions; every idea represents being either actually existing in itself or contained in a cause. We have an idea of the Infinite. The Infinite is, then, a real being. It cannot be contained in the power of a cause. Therefore, it actually exists.

To this argument my critic replies, in substance, as follows: Besides the merely possible and the actually existent there is, relatively to human knowledge, a third class of objects; there is, to wit, a "positive, thinkable something" which, as far as we know, is not *determinately* a merely possible thing nor an *ens actuale*. *A parte rei*, it may be either. In order to discover whether it exists actually or only potentially we must use the faculties with which nature has provided us, and investigate the case. This third object is called the "simply possible." To illustrate: A may be either dead or alive. He is certainly one or the other. A person ignorant of A's history must make inquiries if he desire to know whether or not he be yet living.

This reply does not, it seems to me, touch the point at issue. The "simply possible" is by no means and in no sense a medium be-

tween the objectively "merely possible" and "actually existent." It signifies nothing else than "dubiously existent." Is my critic playing with words when he uses "possible" in the sense in which he here employs it? I have given the philosophical definition of the term "possible" above. It means that which is contained in the power of a cause. As my objector employs it, it does not affect the object *a parte rei*, but the mind which thinks. It implies merely that with relation to this mind the existence of such or such an object is doubtful, uncertain, unknown. But how, we would ask, can a dubious state of a man's mind be called a medium between an *ens existens in se* and an *ens existens in alio*? Before we begin our inquiry as to the existence of the Infinite, that existence is "simply possible;" that is to say, we do not know whether the Infinite exists or not. If we supposed the Infinite as a certain, undeniable objective reality, it would be superfluous to investigate. The same is true of the other example which my critic employs. Before inquiring we do not know whether or not there exists in nature a snow-capped mountain. By reasoning from the principle "*Objectum intellectus est ens*" we arrive at the conclusion that the mountain is at least a possible being, and that the Infinite—which cannot be contained in a cause, and cannot, therefore, be merely possible—is an actual reality. The subjective doubt or ignorance which we had previous to inquiry in no wise affects the conclusions here deduced. If nothing else can be brought forward against the validity of my conclusions they seem to remain quite firm and unshaken.

The remaining remarks implying a stricture of my views need hardly be touched upon. I quite agree to the definition of the nature contained in the human idea of the Infinite. It is a "mixed, improper and analogical one." The question as to the origin of that idea is entirely out of place in this connection, and I pass it over. It is sufficient for our purpose that we possess such an intellectual concept, and we care not whence it came. Finally, the assertion as to the distinction between *physical* and *metaphysical* real being has already been disposed of above.

Having thus fully explained my position, I submit it to the judgment of the philosophical public, and without any ill-will towards my opponent, I retire from this controversy, hopeful that the discussion may have served to cast some light on momentous and important questions.

L. F. KEARNEY, O. P.

CLERICAL STUDIES.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

PHILOSOPHY (CONTINUED.)

PHILOSOPHY is the necessary crowning of a liberal education. It is the basis of all theological study. As embodied in, or giving birth to, theories of moral and social life, it is one of the most potent factors in human action. Hence the evident necessity for the clerical student to become acquainted from the beginning with its teachings, and, later on, amidst the manifold duties of his ministry as a priest, to watch its course, and, so far as may be, to guide its action on the minds of his contemporaries.

We have now to consider how this may be best accomplished. The question is a complex one. It concerns equally the beginners and the proficient, those who teach and those who learn. It implies in some measure, besides, a choice between rival schools and methods.

Happily we are not left to ourselves for a reply. In his memorable Encyclical, of the 4th August, 1879, Leo XIII. points out clearly, though in general terms, the course to be followed, and, although his instructions are familiar to most of our readers, we may be permitted in the present paper to recall some of the most important among them.

I.

First of all, our Holy Father would have us ENGRAFT OUR PHILOSOPHY ON THE WISDOM OF THE PAST.

"Verum ut pretiosis suis afferendis fructibus par Philosophia inveniatur, omnino oportet ut ab eo tramite nunquam deflectat quem veneranda Patrum antiquitas ingressa est." Like all true science and art, Philosophy has, at every stage of its existence, to be built on what has gone before. Of its very nature it comes forth, not full-grown and clad in armour, like Minerva from the brain of Jupiter, but slowly evolved from many minds and shaped by the wisdom of ages. To depart in some particulars from such a tradition may be occasionally allowable and even necessary. It is through dissatisfaction with current solutions, arguments and theories that men are led to seek for and to find better. Where the old rulings are never questioned, where no effort is made to look more deeply and see more accurately into the problems of thought,

the mind becomes stagnant and loses all its power. Its unrest, on the contrary, is often a sign of youth and vigor—a sort of prophetic anticipation, like that of Columbus, leading to the discovery of vast and hitherto unexplored continents in the intellectual world. But to break away bodily from the past and undertake to build up all things anew, as Descartes, Kant, and others have attempted to do, can never be wise. Still less is such a process admissible in regard to doctrines and methods long and closely wedded to revealed truth. In the Catholic Church there is necessarily a certain continuity of Philosophical as well as of Christian thought, and Leo XIII. only recalls the practice of the greatest religious minds of all times when he tells us that, whilst looking around and beyond us, we have still more to look backward and gather inspiration and guidance from the past.

II.

The second principle laid down by the Encyclical is LOYALTY TO REVEALED TRUTH.

For a Christian, this is not only a religious duty ; it is a logical necessity. We cannot, like some erratic thinkers of mediaeval times, admit things as true in philosophy and false in theology. A genuine belief in Revelation excludes whatever is opposed to it, and this it is that constitutes the essence of a Christian philosophy.

Secular philosophy recognizes no rule, no limit to human thought outside itself. Such was the philosophy of pagan antiquity. It is that of those modern schools which have proclaimed themselves independent of all authority from without or from above. Our Encyclical rightly traces back their main source to the Protestant Reformation. "Adnitentibus novatoribus sæculi XVI, placuit philosophari citra quempiam ad fidem respectum, petita dataque vicissim potestate quælibet pro lubitu ingenioque excogitandi."

Christian philosophy, on the contrary, is that which not only adapts itself to all the requirements of Christian orthodoxy, but finds in the data of Faith, a constant appeal to its highest powers of speculation, and at the same time gives a sense of security and of intellectual strength which contact with divine doctrine can alone impart. As a fact, never has the mind of man shown such a combination of penetration, depth, elevation and serenity, as in the philosophical handling of the mysterious truths of the Christian faith.

Such a philosophy has always existed in the Church, though in various shapes. Approaching the doctrines of faith, with minds al-

ready fashioned by the speculations of the period, the Fathers instinctively sought to harmonize the two different forms of truth, and borrowed freely from each to illustrate and expand the other. Indeed, to the earlier Greek Fathers, philosophy seemed to have something of a divine character. It was a manner of natural revelation —the special gift of God to the Greeks. Whatever of truth the latter possessed and set forth in their works, they owed (it was held), to the divine Logos. Can we wonder, if, in the patristic writings, we so often meet views and expressions visibly inspired by the great masters of ancient thought?

But, although freely borrowed from all, the philosophy of the Fathers was mainly that of Plato. Between the intuitions of that great thinker and the highest teachings of Christianity, there were points of contact and resemblances strange and striking. His fascinating theory of ideas, immutable, eternal, and dwelling (so the Fathers understood him), in the Divine Intellect itself, his admirable exposition of the existence and of attributes of the Divine Being, the poetic and often forcible proofs of the immortality of the soul scattered through his dialogues, his deep sense of the reality and supremacy of the invisible world, it alone being, as it were, solid and substantial, whilst the world of sense was a something shadowy, unreal, oscillating between being and non-being, and last, though not least, the ascetic, elevating character of many of his moral doctrines, all this invested with the charms of a poetic imagination and set forth in the most exquisite language, was more than sufficient to captivate the Fathers, many of them men of high philosophic and literary culture. And so Plato, became their inspirer and their guide, and Platonism, divested of its errors, the Christian philosophy of their times.

In a much fuller sense, Aristotle, was the intellectual dictator of a later period—not indeed the Aristotle comparatively genuine and complete we now possess, but an Aristotle fragmentary, and as much distorted as illustrated by translation and commentary. Yet, even in that imperfect condition, and though devoid of all literary charm, the writings of the great and long-neglected philospher were destined to exercise on Christian thought a formative influence deeper and more abiding than any other.

The time had come to organize the elements hitherto disconnected of Christian belief, to gather up and build into the regular forms of a science all that human thought under divine guidance had evolved from the first data of Revelation. Only a philosophy,

both speculative and practical, spreading out in every direction and touching on truths of all kinds, with methods to analyze, to classify, to build up thought into structural form, only such a philosophy could serve the purpose, and just at the time it came to hand in the principal works of Aristotle. Less Christian than Plato, his theories, nevertheless, lent themselves infinitely better to the development of most of the Christian Doctrines. They came nearer to the average intelligence by their constant reference to experience and to the common sense of men. His genius was more practical and better suited to the Western mind, yet his powers of generalization were greater, and as a master of method he stood high above all. A high place was therefore naturally assigned to him in the new science. Scholastic Theology was literally built on the Bible, the Sentences and Aristotle. As it took shape under the great Doctors of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, while still retaining some of the earlier conceptions, it became in its fundamental theories, in its forms, in its vocabulary, in all its leading aspects, essentially Aristotelian.

One would expect that an alliance so close and sanctioned by such high authorities should last forever. But it was not to be. When we come down to the seventeenth century we find Aristotle and the scholastic philosophy fast losing ground in the public mind and weakening even in the schools. Yet awhile and the decay will show itself more visible and more rapid still, until, as happened in the first half of the present century, scholasticism has become a thing of the past, and its very language so little in use or even understood, that in the general directions given in 1832 to the professors of philosophy of the Society of Jesus, we find a recommendation which has all the appearance of a concession, that at least the future students of theology should be taught the meaning of the scholastic terms they were likely to meet.[1]

Yet it cannot be said that during this last period the Church was without a philosophy. Independently of what survived of scholasticism in some of the schools and in some of the religious orders; new thoughts and new theories had come to light, and were welcomed by theologians as well as by the world at large. Associated with the names of Descartes, Malebranche, Leibnitz, Balmes, Rosmini, etc., they became familiar to the new, as pure scholasticism

1. Quamvis eæ fugiendæ sint voces quibus, quæ res subjiciuntur, facile intelligi non possint, sermonem tamen scholasticorum cos non ignorare necesse est qui theologiæ deinde vacabunt. PACHTLER RATIO STUDIORUM, Soc. Jes. II, 332.

had been to the older generations. It was a sort of eclecticism, not very deep, or systematic, or strong ; yet it was truly a Christian Philosophy, loyal to the faith and to the Church, and concurred as in the past, to light up the obscurities of revealed truth, defend its doctrines and establish a lasting peace between Reason and Faith.

But it would seem as if a permanent basis for such an alliance could never be found. Within our own generation a new current of thought has set in, leading back our schools to the philosophy of the middle ages, and giving once more to the great minds of the past something of the unquestioned and beneficent sway which they held so long and had lost to the great detriment of religious and philosophical truth.

The preponderant share of Leo XIII. in this movement is sufficiently known. The Encyclical "Æterni Patris" deals largely with it, and in this connection supplies us with a new and important rule for our guidance.

III.

The rule is laid down in the shape of a clear and strong recommendation to GO BACK TO THE DOCTRINES OF S. THOMAS as the most complete and the safest guide in philosophical as well as in theological inquiries. The recommendation is based on reasons which we would gladly recall if space permitted, but which are accessible to all in the text of the Encyclical. What we are most concerned in presently is to ascertain its true sense in this particular aspect. For the "teaching" recommended to us as a rule, of one like S. Thomas, whose voluminous writings touch upon thousands of questions, can hardly be said to extend to all that is stated or countenanced, or implied in them ; nor can it be applied in the same measure to each one of those doctrines to which S. Thomas unquestionably lends something of the weight of his authority.

The question, as may be seen, is far from being a simple one. If we may venture to suggest a reply, we would distinguish in the philosophy of S. Thomas the three constitutive elements of all comprehensive plilosophical systems—its Methods, its Truths and its Problems.

By Methods in general we mean the processes by which the mind is led to knowledge ; the discipline by which it is trained to discern truth from falsehood, to demonstrate, to discover, to reach in short the highest attainable exercise of its powers.

By Truths we understand the ascertained principles of the human intellect. Some are the logical basis of reason itself; others are the necessary groundwork of moral action or of religious belief ; others,

still, whilst practically less essential, yet add considerably to the range and grasp of the mind, lighting up and ordering in it much that without them would remain hopelessly dark and confused. They all possess two characteristic features; first, they are either intuitively known or susceptible of clear demonstration; secondly, they commend themselves naturally to the sense and judgment of men, and, as a fact, they supply the common stock of abstract truth in current use, the common ground on which men may meet and hold intercourse of thought together. Philosophical systems are valuable in proportion to the number and breadth of the truths thus supplied, and to the firmness of grasp with which they may be held.

By Problems, we mean those questions ever coming up from the depths of the soul, or suggested by the contemplation of the visible world or of human life, and which have never been satisfactorily answered. It is one of the noblest purposes of philosophy, and what makes its chief attractiveness for many, ever to struggle with them and dispel the mystery that surrounds them. In each succeeding period they give rise to new conjectures and hypotheses, which in most cases afford no general or permanent satisfaction. Rival theories are imagined and flourish for a time, and then they are neglected and decay. And so the Problems remain, with the systems they have given birth to, still dividing the most thoughtful and the most enlightened minds.

As a rule, the truths and problems are closely connected, the truths standing out in the foreground, whilst the problems emerge from behind them. Thus I know for certain that I am free, but whence my liberty proceeds and how it can coexist with the other laws of my nature is a problem. The reality of bodies is a truth; their essence and ultimate elements a problem. The close connection and correspondence of body and soul cannot be questioned—how they act upon each other can only be conjectured. I carry within me the notions of causality, goodness, duty, etc., etc., but where have they come from? The question has been before the world for ages, and still remains undecided.

Such, then, are the main elements of every system of thought, Method, Truths, and Problems with the Theories which they originate, all in combination with numberless notions, remarks, views, illustrations, arguments, which gather round or proceed from the central points of each system. All this, as has been said, we find in S. Thomas, and the question comes back: to what in these principal features and minor elements does the Papal recommendation extend?

First, there can be no doubt that it applies in full to the method of S. Thomas, unquestionably in this the highest representative of those scholastic processes, of which Leo recalls the praises written centuries before by another great Pope, Sixtus V.: "Apta illa et inter se nexa rerum et causarum cohœrentia, ille ordo et dispositio tanquam militum in pugnando instructio; illæ dilucidæ definitiones et distinctiones; illa argumentorum firmitas et acutissimæ disputationes, quibus lux a tenebris, verum a falso distinguitur hæreticorum mendacia multis prœstigiis et fallaciis involuta, tanquam veste detracta patefiunt et denudantur."

Here we have the characteristic features of the scholastic method —accuracy, clearness, subtlety of distinction and analysis, logical order, strength of argument, and at the same time a striking picture of the method of S. Thomas, as Pope Leo loves to repeat, and as may be seen at a glance by whoever has even a superficial knowledge of the writings of the Angelic Doctor.

In this all are practically at one. Even those who have departed from the more rigid forms of the school acknowledge their indebtedness to them, and are the first to proclaim that the precision and accuracy of thought, so much greater in modern than in ancient times, is principally the work of the mediæval schoolmen.

In the second place, the Encyclical refers clearly to the philosophical Truths of S. Thomas.

Here, again, we must refer the reader to the Pontifical document itself. What strikes the mind of the Pontiff is the vast and invaluable body of truths brought together in the writings of the Prince of Theologians—how the wisdom of the Fathers and of the great thinkers of antiquity seems to have come to him as an ancestral heritage, to which he adds abundant treasures of his own, drawn from the depths of a mind, profound, acute, open and active in all directions, and ever guided by an almost unerring judgment. Nobody can read much of S. Thomas without feeling the truth of these remarks. At each page he lights upon ingenious observations, pregnant views, illustrations of the happiest kind, and, above all, great general principles, lighting up almost every region of human knowledge. He feels that the admiration of Leo is more than justified, and that by calling back our age to such an inexhaustible treasure of truth, with all the authority of the Pontiff and the sage, he has done the world at large an invaluable service.

Last of all come the Theories by which St. Thomas and the school have attempted to solve the mysteries of the natural and

of the supernatural world. These theories are borrowed almost entirely from Aristotle, and for this and various other reasons it has been doubted whether they, too, come under the sanction of the Encyclical.

To us the affirmative appears certain. Not, indeed, that the questionable can be commended in the same degree as the unquestioned. But it is clear that the Pontiff has found the solutions and theories of the school more satisfactory than any others, forming a more complete and more consistent system of thought, and less liable to lead away the mind into unsubstantial and unorthodox doctrines. Consistency and safety are surely strong titles to commendation in any system, and the disorder of thought so lamentably prevalent in the world for the last two centuries is well calculated to make men consider whether finally they had not better go back to the conceptions of the past, which, though falling short of demonstration, had satisfied so many great minds and given for centuries intellectual peace to the world.

Such seems to be the sense of the Encyclical, a weighty recommendation to give more attention and thought to the writings of St. Thomas and to the whole philosophy of the schools—too much and too long neglected—with the assurance that such attention and thought would be abundantly repaid. The Pope could not have meant to go farther. Philosophy, as such, that is, outside its connection with revealed truth, does not come any more under his authority than natural science. He deals with it in his directive capacity, not as the infallible teacher of Christians. He knows, besides, that outside the region of religious belief and of evident truth the mind is essentially free, and cannot, even if it would, bind itself to what has failed to satisfy it.

Nor should his recommendation be extended to all the particulars of the scholastic philosophy. He himself distinctly disclaims any such purpose. "Si quid enim est a doctoribus scholasticis vel nimia subtilitate quasitum, vel parum considerate traditum ; si quid cum exploratis posterioris ævi doctrinis minus cohærens, vel denique quovis modo non probabile, id nullo pacto in animo est ætati nostræ ad imitandum proponi."

This applies in an especial manner to the Physics of Aristotle, which for ages formed part of the philosophy of the schools. But by the very general and indefinite terms employed, the Pope leaves each one to judge for himself what other opinions may be implied in the restriction.

Again, he cautions us against unauthorized interpretations of S. Thomas, thereby giving us to understand that the great doctor is by no means responsible for all that is attributed to him. Indeed, almost since his works first came to light, the ablest men have been divided as to the true mind of the writer in many passages.

Besides, no commendation of the philosophy of S. Thomas can be interpreted more strictly than that so often bestowed on his theology by the highest authority. Yet we know how broadly and freely such commendation is taken by theologians of the highest note and by religious orders, though pledged by their rules to the doctrines of S. Thomas. Of this we have a notable example in the "Ratio Studiorum," already referred to, in which the general principle is accompanied by a long list of exceptions. The same may be said equivalently of various other religious bodies, thus showing in what a liberal sense loyalty to S. Thomas was understood and practised, even when he was looked up to as a guide. It is a remarkable fact that at the present day, the same freedom of spirit is to be found even among the sons of S. Dominic, the natural heirs and traditional guardians of the Thomistic doctrines. With none do we find more readiness to enlarge the ancient boundaries and to accommodate the traditional teaching to the discoveries and theories of modern science.

Finally the existence of the Scotist school, side by side with that of S. Thomas through so many ages, with the well known differences in Philosophy and Theology which separate them, would be of itself a conclusive demonstration of what we contend for. S. Bonaventure shares with S. Thomas the admiration of the highest authorities in the past and the praise of Leo XIII himself, and whatever we may think of the Scotist doctrines in themselves, we cannot think that the Pontifical document should restrict in any measure the liberty enjoyed by their supporters at all times in the Catholic Church.

Thus limited to its true meaning, the Encyclical loses the restrictive character, which made it objectionable to some only because they confined their attention to separate passages, and failed to grasp the spirit of the whole.

Taken as it stands, we find in it the wisest and most valuable guidance. But because that guidance, is only of a general kind, we have still to deal with a considerable number of questions of detail.

We hope to do so in another paper.

J. HOGAN.

FATHER MINASI ON THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS. [1]

THE publication of a text, discovered eight years ago, and rendered famous on the spot, might seem late on its appearance in 1891. A manuscript newly found was given to the world in 1883 by the Metropolitan of Constantinople; and since that date it has re-appeared under every possible form. It is called the *Διδαχή*, *Didaché*, "The Doctrine or Teaching of the Twelve Apostles." Yet the work recently published by Father Minasi, S. J., seems to be rather the first instalment of a theological and critical kind of erudition and of matured conclusions, which, at the very least, are full of edification for the Catholic world, and furnish from the side of remote antiquity a commentary of the gravest import on the doctrine and practices of the Church to-day.

Were we to dwell at length on the critical erudition exhibited in this work we should still be doing it but scant justice for its perfection of treatment on the different lines of theology, liturgy, history and sacred linguistics. If the author has waited for several years to take note of all the discussions carried on in the learned world, it has not been without the best effects resulting in the comprehensiveness and clearness of his own commentary. Within the limits of that same kind of critical work, already so largely expended on the manuscript, he has contributed of his own learning a wealth of illustration, which renders his production an entirely new monument of research in dogmatic and exegetical science.

The author is led to infer that "The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles" dates from some time after the composition of St. Matthew's Gospel, and before the other three Gospels were composed. It is itself smaller in compass than any one of the four Gospels. He considers that it emanated from a certain Council of the Apostles, held probably at Antioch, and referred to in the Canon of the Holy Apostles, as well as in a letter of Pope Innocent I. The document itself is cited by Eusebius, St. Athanasius, the anonymous author of De Aleatoribus, by Hermas, Barnabas, Clement of Alexandria. (Proemio, Capo III, pp. xix-xxiv.) For its matter and its style of language, it invites comparison chiefly with the Gospel of St. Matthew, the Acts of the Apostles, the first letter of St. Paul to the Corinthians; and, among patristic writings, it admits of special

1 La Dottrina del Signore pei Dodeci Apostoli bandita alle Genti, detta La Dottrina dei Dodeci Apostoli. Versione, note e commentario del P. Ign. M. Minasi d. C. d. G. Roma, Tipografia A. Befani, 1891. Un volume in 8o di pagg. LII, 389.

illustrations only from the very earliest, such as the works of St. Justin Martyr, Hermas, and the Martyr St. Ignatius. (Proemio, p. xviii.) It is more characterized by Hebrew forms of speech than any book of the New Testament. And the whole tenor of it, the tone which pervades it, as well as the very title, "The Teaching of the Lord Through the Twelve Apostles to the Nations," all go to show that the directions which it contains, for priests, levites and the laity, on the gravest subjects of worship and morals, are not being merely transmitted from a higher authority through some intermediary, but are being promulgated directly by the Apostolical authority itself, for the observance of the entire Church of God.

If practically it became a lost monument, because copies were allowed to grow scarce, that would be no unique instance of the kind in the history of the early Church. A sufficient reason for such scarcity existed in the imperfections which crept into current copies. For, as time went on, the document became, in certain parts, somewhat less fitted for the use of the faithful; and, in view of being rendered more practical, it underwent some modifications.

Additions and changes were made, which brought it finally into discredit; and thus it ceased to be ranked among canonical Scriptures. St. Leo touches upon this process.[1] But, as to the copy lately discovered, what with the authenticity attaching to it, as a well preserved and very ancient monument, and the authority intrinsically belonging to it as the teaching of the Lord, formulated by the immediate authority of the Twelve Apostles themselves, it throws into relief questions of dogma, morals, rites and sacred language in a manner prolific of Christian instruction and edification. To attain, however, this result in any considerable degree, the wealth of critical erudition thrown upon it by the learned author is altogether indispensable.

We shall have space to give a single example, which, like any other instance that might be taken, will be drawn from the various parts as they are aptly co-ordinated in the work—from the Proemium, in which the general notions are summarized; from the Text, which is most accurately reproduced, from the author's own Translation, with the Notes immediately appended; but chiefly from the ample Commentary which follows; and, finally, from the interesting Lexicon of words employed in the *Didaché*. The example, which we shall take, is that of the meaning or sense of the most sacred mystical rite, the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. And to this ex-

1 Epistola 15.

planation of the Sacrifice, we shall append the order of Divine worship as observed in the Holy Mass on Sunday.

It is this order of worship on certain days of the week, and especially the ritual on the Lord's Day, that forms the central subject of instruction in the *Didachê*. Sunday, the Lord's own day, as having been signally honored both by His rising from the dead and by His first solemn apparitions, is first and foremost in the week. Next in dignity are Wednesday and Friday. In the first two centuries of the Church's existence the Christians celebrated the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass only on the Lord's Day. As late as the time of St. Justin this was the practice everywhere. It is not necessary, says our author, to define the precise date when the celebration of the Holy Mysteries took place on Wednesday and Friday also, or when Saturday was added. Whatever that date may have been, the day of days in the week at the time when this document was written was the Lord's Day, on which the Mystery of Faith perpetuated the Sacrifice instituted at the Last Supper. Wednesday and Friday were days of fast and penance, the one because of the treason of Judas, the other because of the Passion and Death of Our Lord. Hermas, writing earliest after the time of this document, calls them Stations, which, as we see in our Missals, is the same denomination that has entered into the regular discipline of the Roman Church.

The faithful then, on Sunday, held their σύναξις, *synaxis*. This is an exclusively Christian word, and the meaning of it involves many heads of doctrine. Its proper and principal sense is "the uniting" of the faithful to the Body of the Lord; from which union with Christ followed union among themselves, as if they were one body and one substance among themselves. The argument of the Apostle to the Corinthians turns upon this point (I Cor., x, 17)—"The chalice of benediction which we bless is it not the communion of the Blood of Christ? And the bread, which we break, is it not the partaking of the Body of the Lord? For we being many, are one bread, one body, all that partake of one bread." From the first and principal meaning, so explained, others were derived, so that *synaxis* came to mean the assemblage of the faithful in one place, then the place in which they met, finally the prayer which was offered in that holy place, because in it and with it we are united to Jesus Christ. In this last sense the word *synaxis*, translated into Latin, becomes in Tertullian (*oratio*) *Collecta*, the same word which we use now when we speak of the "Collects" of the Mass.

As the term *synaxis* has for its first meaning the idea of incorporation in the Immaculate Victim on the Altar, and from this meaning others are derived, so the Sacrifice, wherein they are incorporated is the θυσία, *thusia*, which, as the *Didaché* expressly teaches, is the θυσία καθαρά, *thusia kathara*, or "clean oblation," foretold by the Prophet Malachy. And from this first use of the term *thusia*, or "sacrifice," other meanings are derived. The faithful themselves, who are incorporated in the Sacred Victim, are called the "sacrifice." For the *Didaché* teaches that they are to confess their sins and to be reconciled to their brethren, "in order that their sacrifice be clean," "in order that their sacrifice be not profaned." Now, it is quite plain that there can be no question of the Immaculate Victim Himself requiring purification. So that the Church herself is considered as the victim washed and purified. And as Jesus Christ is the Lamb, with the attributes of being innocent and of being intended for sacrificial consecration, so the faithful are styled by the Prince of the Apostles "immaculate lambs," *agni immaculati*. Indeed, as the *Didaché* expresses itself, the Father "has made Christ take up His abode within us." Each one of us becomes, as St. Paul says, "another Christ."

The sacred bread itself, which is taken from the oblations made by the Christians at the Offertory, represents in a symbolic manner the real and underlying purpose of Him, who suffers Himself to be placed under those species. The bread is made up of many grains of wheat, which form one leaven ; so the Body of Christ upon the Altar is considered in the Sacrifice, not merely as what it really is, the physical substance of Christ, but also as what mystically it is, the body of His Church, composed of every tribe and nation under heaven, united intimately, in the holy *synaxis*, to Himself, the Eucharistic Oblation. Hence, the *Didaché* has these words in its beautiful eucharistic prayers, which on the days of the Stations are to be recited by the faithful before Holy Communion : "As this fragment (the species of bread) was scattered over the mountains and was gathered (*i. e.*, the grains of wheat, which form the bread, were gathered), and became one, so may Thy Church be gathered from the confines of the earth into Thy kingdom." This is the gathering of the nations spoken of by the Prophet Malachy, whom the *Didaché* quotes thus : "In every place and time offer me a clean sacrifice, for a great king am I, saith the Lord, and my name is wonderful among the Gentiles." And speaking of these peoples and tribes and nations, St. Paul says that we are the body of Christ ;

that we are one body in Christ; that Jesus is the Saviour of this body; that He is the Head of the body, the Church; that He suffers in His body, the Church.[1] In this same sense, again, the *Didaché* speaks of the mystical body of Christ as sacrificed, as consecrated by oblation. For the exquisite eucharistic prayers, to be used by the faithful after Holy Communion, contain the following: "Remember Thy Church, O Lord, to free it from all evil, and to perfect it in Thy love; and from the four winds unite it (*σύναζον αὐτὴν*, *synaxon auten*), sanctified into Thy kingdom, which Thou hast prepared for it. For Thine is power and glory forever and ever. Let grace come and the world pass away. Hosanna to the Son of David. Amen." Here the word "sanctified" means sacrificed, made holy by oblation; and thus the Church is "made perfect" in the sacrifice of the charity of Jesus Christ.

Several interesting difficulties have attached to some parts of the Canon of the Mass, and what we have just said gives us a footing for clearing them away. How, for instance, does the Priest venture to bless the Consecrated Species after the sacred words have already placed under them the Body of Christ, and there is nothing else there to bless? Or again, how does he come to pray soon after: "Bid these oblations be borne by the hands of the Holy Angel up to Thy sublime Altar," etc.?

The reasons appear from what has been said; they are the same which govern the tenor of the prayers before consecration. Under the form of the bread presented at the offertory the faithful have been symbolically united, from the very first, to Christ, the Head, and to all other members of the Church. Similarly, under the form of water mingled with wine in the chalice, they have been united to Christ, as all the liturgies of the Church indicate. Then, as being so united with Him, they are understood in all that follows. Thus, extending his hands over the oblation, not yet consecrated, the Priest applies the rite of the Old Law to the New, signifying, in precisely the same sense as of old, that the offering over which he extends his hands is substituted for those who offer it, and that these are represented in it. Then, making three signs of the cross over it, he pronounces these words:—*Quam oblationem tu Deus, in omnibus* (membris), *quæsumus, benedictam* (in terris), *adscriptam* (in cœlis), *ratam* (in corpore Christi confirmatam), *rationabilem* (spiritualem) *acceptabilemque facere digneris;* that is to say, while designating the sacred species, he asks that the oblation may be

1 1 Cor. xii. 13; Rom. xii, 5; Eph. v, 23; Coloss. i. 18, 24.

blessed in all its members upon earth, may be entered or registered in heaven, may be ratified in the Body of Christ, may be spiritual, no longer carnal, and so may be acceptable. Clearly, he is contemplating something else before him, in the Sacrifice, than merely the physical Body of Christ about to be placed there. Making two more signs of the cross, he adds: *Ut* (oblatio) *nobis* (pro nobis) *corpus et sanguis fiat dilectissimi filii tui Domini nostri Jesu Christi;* the desires expressed in the preceding part of the prayer will be fulfilled, if the oblation which he is designating and blessing become the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ.

When the consecration has been accomplished, the faithful are effectually united, as the mystical body, to their Head present and sacrificed. This union is what is signified by the term, *synaxis*. The Priest blesses the *synaxis;* he prays that it may be taken up by the hands of the Holy Angel to the sublime Altar of the Divine Majesty; and that all, who are partakers, sharers, in this sacred Altar or sacrifice, may be filled with every celestial grace and benediction. It is only when the sacrifice itself is entirely completed, in the Holy Communion, that the faithful partaking in it will be replenished with every grace. Then Christ at last is incorporated vitally in every living member present. No wonder our Lord has multiplied His presence on myriads of altars over the world, that, from the rising of the sun to the going down of the same, "in every place *and time*," (as the *Didaché* quotes the words of Malachy), this vital incorporation of each and every child of man in Christ's own Being may be possible to all, by the *synaxis*, or union in His Sacrifice completed at the eucharistic banquet of Holy Communion!

Just by the way, we may remark, what light this doctrine throws on the Sacrament of Matrimony, as explained by St. Paul! (Eph. v, 22-32). Explaining this union, the Apostle declares it to be a great Sacrament, and he adds emphatically: "But I speak in Christ and in the Church." He has enjoined on husbands to love their wives; he has required wives to be subject to their husbands in all things. And what are the reasons? He repeats them over and over again: That Christ is the Head of the Church; that He is the Saviour of His body; that Christ loves and nourishes and cherishes the Church, "because we are members of His body, of His flesh, and of His bones. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother; and shall cleave to his wife; and they shall be two in one flesh. This is a great Sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church."

We have taken this one instance of the author's treatment to show how his researches illustrate the liturgy; and not only that, but dogma also, whereof liturgy is an authentic and organized expression. To complete the instance, we may add from this proemium the sketch which he gives of the Lord's day, as hallowed by this most solemn act of divine worship.

He premises and demonstrates from St. Justin Martyr, that the ordinances relative to this day are from our Lord Himself, who instructed the Apostles on various occasions after His Resurrection. Then the author goes on to describe the ritual observed on Sunday.

The faithful assemble, either in the synagogue, which has become Christian or in the cœnaculum of a private Christian, like that "Church which was in the house" of Prisca and Aquila, at Rome. (Rom. xvi, 5.) The day on which they meet is called, in Jewish language, *una Sabbatorum*, "the first day of the Sabbath," in Gentile terms, *dies Solis*, Sunday; in Christian terminology, *dies Dominica*, "the Lord's Day." A section is read from a Prophet, or some part from the Gospel; then follows the homily delivered by the President, the *antistes*, the *archiereus*, that is to say, the Bishop; after that, the confession of sins and the reprehensions. Prayers are now offered up for all the faithful, and by them all.

These being finished, the Deacon takes part of the offerings made by the faithful, a loaf and a chalice of wine. He delivers the oblations to the President, who rehearses over them the words and actions of Our Lord at the Last Supper. So the *Didachê* expressly directs; and then says no more about it, referring merely to the Gospel of Our Lord: "As you have in the Gospel of Our Lord."

The consecration being thus effected, the President alone in the name of all makes a solemn thanksgiving to God the Father, for all gifts granted in the order of nature and grace. After this thanksgiving, the consecrated gifts are distributed to those present and borne to those absent by the hands of the Deacons. And the faithful, having received the Body and Blood of the Lord, sing hymns to Jesus Christ.

The authors says: "The sense of this rite was understood in this manner. The offering of the substances necessary to support life is made instead of the persons offering, who are represented therein. When the bread and wine have been consecrated, the body of the faithful are represented now, not in the offerings which were made, but in the Body itself of the Lord; and for the body of the

faithful the Body of the Lord is substituted. The conception is fundamental in the sacred rites of Jews and Christians."[1]

The idea of personal presence at Mass, on the part of the faithful, is so much a part of the original conception, that the author notes it as an addition made later in the Roman Canon of the Mass to include expressly those "for whom we offer," as distinct from "those who offer."

So much for the sacrifice itself, and its place in the week. The *Didaché* treats besides of the Ministers destined for the celebration of the Holy Mysteries. They are called *episcopi* and Deacons, different from the Apostles, Prophets and Doctors. These *episcopi* mentioned here and in the New Testament, generally, are proved to be not what we mean by Bishops; for, in that sense, the Apostle, or his consecrated legate, the President, the *antistes*, the *archiereus* of the *synaxis*, is the Bishop. The *episcopi*, spoken of both here and in the New Testament, are priests as understood by us. This is abundantly shown by the author.[2]

The precise state of the Church for which the document legislates is one which has never existed since the first century. It speaks of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost as common among the Christians, and of the ministry of the Prophets, still subsisting as in the Old Law. Of these charismata St. Paul treats at length in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, chapters XII-XIV. The *Didaché*, morever, addresses Christian communities in which there was not yet established a *Presbyterium*, or clergy, composed of Bishop, Priests and Deacons, under the general jurisdiction of an Apostle or some legate of the Apostles.

Belonging to the latter class of apostolic chiefs were Evodius at Antioch, Mark at Alexandria, Timothy at Ephesus, Titus in Crete.[3] The apostolic authority with which Paul and Barnabas were invested included all that was termed, at a subsequent period, "episcopal." The present designation, "Bishop," had not as yet the fixed and settled meaning, which it was to receive in the future.[4]

These well-formed Christian communities, not yet provided with the Priesthood in their midst, had their origin in the conversion of entire snyagogues to the faith, or of portions which withdrew from a rebellious synagogue and formed a Church among themselves. So the Apostle St. Paul did with his neophytes at Corinth.[5] St.

1 Proemio, capo v., p. XI. 2 Commentario, cc., XXIII-XXV.
3 Proemio, capo III, p. XVIII; Comentario, c. XVII. 4 Commentario, c. XXIII, p. 232.
5 Acts XVIII., 7, i. Minasi, Proemio, c. VI.

James addresses his Catholic epistle "to the twelve tribes which are scattered abroad." St. Peter indites his first letter "to the strangers dispersed through Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia and Bithynia."

Writing in A. D. 112, Pliny the Younger says that he found in Bithynia many Christians who had professed the faith for twenty years before his arrival; and he speaks of the large numbers belonging to every order and class of persons; he describes how they are scattered in the cities, the towns and the country; and he states that the temples are deserted, there are no more sacrifices, and none to purchase victims.[1]

But we are now touching upon points, any one of which would furnish an example similar to the one we have chosen, for illustrating early Christian faith and practice. We might mention, besides, the newness of the Christian code of morals presented at that time to a Gentile world; and even a newness of Christian language which had to correspond. But, having filled the space available we can do no more than refer to the learned work from which the above is taken.

THOS. HUGHES, S. J.

SCIENTIFIC AND METAPHYSICAL COSMOLOGY.

(THIRD ARTICLE.)

Proof of the Scholastic Theory.

THE strongest argument in favor of the Peripatetic theory as to the essential principles of bodies is that which is drawn from the never-ceasing substantial changes which take place in the material universe.

It is a postulate of common sense, which no scientist will ever dream of denying, that there is such a thing as a substantial difference in bodies—a difference which is manifested by the variety and dissimilarity of attributes and operations of the same. Air, for instance, is something substantially different from water. Water is something substantially different from wood—the latter something wholly dissimilar in substance from ashes, from grass, flesh, bones, and the like. This difference does not consist in a diversity of combinations of previous substances, as homogeneous or heteroge-

1 Lib. X., ep. 97.

neous, but is found in the first and fundamental being itself, which locates and establishes each body in its own proper species.

Now, it is a part of common daily observation that the substances just mentioned and others innumerable, under the action of proportionate and adequate causes, are changed into others. Thus, wood, under the action of fire, is changed into ashes ; the latter, dissolved in water and attracted by the plant, is turned into an alimentary fluid of the same. This fluid, undergoing different elaborations, is changed into buds, and flowers and fruits. The fruit, partaken of by the animal, is transformed into blood, and afterwards into muscles, tendons, nerves, membranes, and other organic parts of the animal. The same must be said of the continual transformations going on unceasingly in the three kingdoms of this visible world.

The schoolmen, backed by the universal verdict of mankind, contend that these changes are substantial—that is that when, for example, wood is changed into ashes, the substance of the wood disappears and a new substance takes its place.

Science, of course, admits these facts, but some scientists deny that such changes are substantial, contending that in all these transformations, so-called, and transmutations of bodies, nothing substantial perishes, and consequently that no new substance is substituted instead of the first. They maintain that every new body is formed of the same identical atoms which were part and parcel of the previous body, atoms which undergo no essential change or alteration whatever. They explain the fact of the change by supposing a new arrangement and order and binding together of the same parts, which, by these accidental external phases, develop new and previously undiscovered properties and operations. In other words, they hold all change to be merely accidental and external to the atoms, which remain unchangeable, and are only outwardly affected.

The esteemed author of "Mediaeval and Modern Cosmology," with that absolute confidence which characterizes him says ; "These (the schoolmen) considered the terrestrial elements to be something transmutable, whereas modern chemistry holds the immutability of the properties of the ultimate chemical atoms," page 17 and more clearly page 21. "It is an antiquated view that life, whether in plants or animals, or man, changes the intrinsic nature of the ultimate chemical elements, molecules, or atoms. These remain the same whether in or outside an organized body. Hence the scholastic view of a changing form and a permanent matter is, according to

the present state of chemical science, inadmissible even as far as the most ultimate possible chemical elements or atoms are concerned." Again, "We must say, according to the present state of chemical science, that these ultimate molecules or atoms can naturally have only that form, which they have, as it is the only one given them by the Creator, and so far as human observation reaches, cannot be altered by any human agency."

When this author on the strength of such stupendous display of knowledge of modern chemistry undertakes to lecture and to chastise the best philosophical intellects of the world; when he does his best to inflict on them the stigma of deliberate, wilful ignorance, and by implication represents them as the enemies of science and of modern progress, he should at least speak sense, be consistent with himself, and not turn the very science which he so much idolizes against himself.

Atoms can only have that form which the Creator gave them! As far as observation goes that form cannot be altered by human agency! Pray how do you know that the Creator intended atoms to have but one form? Observation indeed! Who has ever observed, or ever pretended to have observed that atoms cannot be altered by human agency? To listen to this author one would think that the existence of atoms was a thing ascertained beyond the possibility of a doubt, that they were the easiest thing in the world to be found as a subject of observation and experiment, that they could be seen, handled, smelled, tasted by any one who pleased, that they could be taken up or laid down at pleasure. Does he forget that he himself has admitted the existence of atoms to be problematic? (page 15.) For the edification of our readers we will produce a few scientific authorities upon the subject. "They (atoms) are so small, that they can neither be seen nor counted, even by means of the most powerful magnifying glass, and they have, therefore, only an imaginary existence." (Stöckardt Principles of Chemistry page 246.)

Wurtz, in his "Atomic Theory," a standard work on the subject, says: "In admitting the existence of atoms we employ an hypothesis. I know well that atoms are invisible and inappreciable to the senses, and I do not believe that the direct proof of their existence and mutual attraction can ever be furnished." (The Atomic Theory, by Ar. Wurtz, N. Y., Appleton, 1881.)

Professors Armstrong and Meldola, in the Encyclopædia Britannica, say: "The exceeding small masses or molecules, of which *it is supposed* matter consists, are composite beings, made up of in-

divisible particles or atoms. The molecules of the elements *are assumed* to consist of similar atoms; whereas those of compounds are congeries of dissimilar atoms, and the molecules which constistitute a given kind of matter, *it is supposed*, are alike in weight and general properties, but differ from those of which all other kinds of matter are composed, so that every molecule belongs to one of different kinds of species." (Encyclop. Brit., art. Chemistry.)

We presume now to ask, if by acknowledgment of all true scientists the very existence of atoms is held to be highly doubtful; if they are *assumed* or *supposed* for the sake of building a theory; if the reason of that doubt lies in the fact that they defy all effort at being observed or examined, as they are beyond all natural or artificial means of observation, how can anyone who respects his own intelligence or that of his readers, assert so categorically and so peremptorily that they have, and can have, only one form—the one given them by the Creator—and that that form is absolutely unchangeable? How can anyone pretend that the only possible change which can be supposed in them is that of a different arrangement and different way of grouping them together? A general of an army, who arranges his corps, and his brigades, his regiments, and his battalions, and who can scan every movement and every evolution in the same with his telescope, could not be more certain than is the author of "Mediæval and Modern Cosmology" in arranging his atoms, which he never *saw*, which nobody has ever *seen*, which can never be *seen* by human eyes, instrument or no instrument, and in accounting for every change and every evolution to explain the constant transformation which takes place in bodies.

But is it really true that Chemistry admits the unchangeableness *in the nature* of the ultimate atoms?

Undoubtedly the contrary. This for the very good reason that Chemistry disclaims to have anything to do with *the nature* of atoms. Here are a few authorities: "The properties of elementary and compound bodies are probably dependent upon the *innate nature* of atoms, upon their form and their mode of motion. But these *matters are uncertain and unknown.*" (Wurtz, page 331.)

"We make no assumption," says Professor Maxwell, "with respect to the *nature* of the small parts (atoms)." (Ency. Brit., Art. Atom).

This disclaiming all knowledge as to the intrinsic nature of atoms is in perfect harmony and keeping with the object of true science, which is, as Chevreul expressed it so emphatically, *what I have seen.*

Not being able to bring the atom, its form, its mode of motion, its nature, under observation and experiment, true science abandons all pretension to have anything to say as to all those subjects. But the author we are dealing with has no such unnecessary scruples, and states without hesitation or doubt that atoms can only have one form ; that their intrinsic nature is unchangeable, and that whoever does not take these statements on the faith of his word is an enemy of science and of progress, which is the besetting sin of Catholic philosophers of ancient and modern times.

We contend that all the well-ascertained results of chemistry point the other way—in the opposite direction of the opinions of the author we are alluding to. They prove, as far as they can go, a capacity of change and transformation in the atoms. In our first article we alluded to the phenomenon of the chemical combination of bodies. We must speak of it here at some length, not only to study its real nature, but also in order to pave our way for the demonstration of the scholastic theory.

Two or more simple heterogeneous bodies are sought to be fused together so as to make one compound. These bodies, differing from each other in nature, in attributes and in operation, are placed under the action of chemical causes, and what happens?

First, a profound internal alteration and transformation is produced in the components. This is evinced by the phenomena which they exhibit.

Secondly, the effect and result of the transformation is a homogeneous compact mass.

Thirdly, this mass develops properties and operations different from, and oftentimes contrary to, those of the component bodies.

Fourthly, the specific weight of the compound mass is found to be equal to the sum of the weight of the constituent bodies.

Fifthly, this change is permanent, and the components could never, by themselves, return to their former state.

Let us select a few authorities. Pelouze and Fremy in their General Chemistry, a standard work on the subject, say: "Chemical combination is characterized by a profound modification of the bodies combined by a change of smell, of color, of taste, and by the complete homogeneousness of the mass consequent upon the combination. It is ordinarily accompanied by a change of temperature and by an emission of light and electricity. Thus if we heat a mixture of copper and of sulphur, heat at once determining the affinity of copper for sulphur disengages a strong light and heat,

and a black homogeneous body is found which *differs essentially* from copper and sulphur—the sulphate of copper. In this case a chemical combination has taken place."

The eminent chemist, Bertholot, states the theory in the same manner: "The object of chemistry is the exact knowledge of the facts of combination. Thus, two or more bodies, in the presence of, and under certain special agents, are totally transformed, and engender a new body, the properties of which are different from those of the elements of the constituent bodies, and the weight of which is equal to the sum of that of the components. Thus, for instance, if we place some water, acidulated with sulphuric acid, in a voltameter, crossed by a current from a pile, we shall observe at once a different gas to escape from each of the electrodes—oxygen and hydrogen—two properties very distinct and different; two new bodies, and the sum of their weight is equal to the decomposed water. The transformation is complete; it is also permanent to the extent that the gases, left to themselves, can never regenerate the water which produced them." (Dictionaire des Dictionaires art. Chemistry).

Finally the words of Professor Watt, the greatest authority on the subject, will close the list of our quotations. "A true chemical compound exhibits properties different from those of either of its constituent elements, and the proportions of these constituents, which form that particular compound, admit of no variation whatever." (Manual of Chemistry, page 3, Philadelphia, 1885.)

The better to illustrate the nature of chemical combination, chemists take good care to compare it with chemical *mixture*, and to point out the essential differences of the one from the other.

"In the mixture, on the contrary," says the "General Chemistry" above quoted, "bodies undergo no observable modification or change of temperature, nor emit any light. If the mixture be made of solid matter, one can easily distinguish the different parts by means of instruments, or of the naked eye; and by means of a mechanical process one can easily effect a separation of the different bodies forming the mixture." (Page 3.)

The chemical combination, then, differs from the mixture, inasmuch as in the first its components undergo a deep and internal transformation, whereas in the second no alteration can be observed. In the first the components are so fused together as to result in a homogeneous, compact mass—a new body,—having properties and

operations different from those of each of its constituents. In the mixture no homogeneous or compact mass is produced.

In the first, no trace of the component parts is observable; in the second, they can easily be discerned by the naked eye, or by means of instruments. And, finally, the first is constant and permanent, and its constituent parts cannot be reduced to their former state without chemical agents; whereas in the latter they can be so reduced by means of mechanical instruments.

Now these absolutely certain and well-ascertained results of science, this total change and transformation of two or more bodies into one homogeneous, compact mass, differing in attributes and operation from those of its constituent parts, must receive *a proper, adequate explanation.*

Some chemists, like the author we are contending with, pretend that the change is merely accidental, that it does not change the internal nature, structure, or form of the component parts.

Upon this explanation we have to remark in the first place that it it has not a single fact to rest upon. Let us listen to one of its most strenuous supporters. "Our present convictions that such transmutation (substantial) is impossible are based on the knowledge we have obtained by following to its legitimate consequences the great principle of Newton: when the weight remains we are persuaded that the material remains. The weight of the sulphide of iron is exactly equal to that of sulphur and iron combined. Hence we conclude that every atom of the iron, and every atom of the sulphur still remain in our product, the only difference being, that whereas previously the atoms of sulphur were associated together to form molecules of the sulphur, and those of the iron to form molecules of the iron, they are now associated with each other to form molecules of sulphide of iron." (Cooke, Atomic Theory, page 106, N. Y., Appleton.)

We abstain from commenting on the amusing way in which this author gets over the difficulty of the chemical combination of sulphur and iron. You are very much puzzled to explain how certain atoms of iron and certain atoms of sulphur come together so as to produce a new body with properties wholly different from those of the component parts? Why! you must be very simple indeed to take so much trouble and to be so much exercised. You must have very little confidence indeed in the resources of science, and must be quite new to its miraculous inventive genius. There is nothing more easy than the explanation of that fact. When sulphur was

sulphur, and iron iron, it meant simply that a certain number of atoms of sulphur were associated together to form molecules of sulphur, and that a certain number of atoms of iron were associated together to form molecules of iron. They are *now* associated together to form molecules of sulphide of iron. If you don't admire such lucid explanation it is evident that you must be very hard to please indeed!

The only appearance of reason given in the passage in favor of the theory is that the weight of the compound being equal to the sum of the weight of the components it is inferred that no change whatever must have taken place in the components by the chemical combination. Now if these scientists were to pay a little attention to the most elementary rules of reasoning they would see that their conclusion is wider than the premises. Because one property of the components remain in the compound they concluded that no change whatever has taken place. The legitimate consequence would be whatever changes the facts of combination imply they must be explained in such a way as not to conflict with the fact of the weight remaining unchangeable. And it is thus that all chemists of different opinion have explained it:

"Matter," says Youmans, "may be changed from state to state thousands of times without the smallest loss. A pound of ice converted into water or into steam continues to weigh exactly a pound. When fuel is burned or water disappears by evaporation or our own bodies are resolved into earth and air it is only the migrations of matter through the circle of natural transformation. *Forms alone are destroyed; matter remains imperishable.* (Class Book of Chemistry, page 28, Appleton, New York.) And this is the only possible explanation; otherwise the well ascertained facts of chemical observation and experiments cannot be accounted for in any satisfactory way.

Two bodies of different nature and properties are brought under the action of chemical agents, and at once a transformation and alteration takes place in them. Their temperature is changed, their color, taste, smell become different. An amount of light and electricity is generated by them. They become fused into one homogeneous compact mass. A new body results from the combination. This new body yields properties and operation totally different from those of the constituent parts. These become absolutely indiscernible. The change is permanent. And in spite of all these facts you pretend that no internal modification, no essential change,

no substantial transformation has taken place; in fact, that the constituent bodies have not been internally affected in any way whatever except and inasmuch as they have been placed under a different arrangement? What right have you to make such statement in utter conflict with the combined force of all the facts pointing to the opposite view? Have you seen or observed that the component parts, after the combination, preserve their nature, properties, structure and form? If so, where are your proofs and your authorities? But you could observe no such thing, as it is admitted by all scientists that the constituents of a chemical compound, after the combination, are absolutely unobservable. And you pretend to go by science, by observation, by experiment and reproach the schoolmen, the very élite of human intelligence, with revelling among the misty heights of metaphysical abstractions? Your explanation, then, is in utter conflict with the facts observed by true science. It does away, also, with all possible chemical combination, and reduces everything to a chemical mixture.

If no internal change takes place, no substantial transformation in the constituents of a compound, if no fusion take place of the component bodies into another different from each, then all combination becomes external, accidental and consequently of approach and juxtaposition, in other words a chemical mixture. But science distinguishes the two most carefully; it describes their different nature, and marks with greatest possible accuracy all those points wherein one essentially differs from the other. Therefore your explanation is in utter conflict with science.

Cooke admits the consequence that in his theory all chemical combination is reduced to a mixture. "According *to our atomic theory* then chemical combination is only a mixture of finer degree."

Here one may ask: Is there any fact of science proving such a thing? We subjoin the words of the author. "If we place on the stage of a powerful microscope a portion of the powder with which we have just been experimenting we can distinguish the grains of sulphur and those of iron, side by side; and so *according to our theory*, if we could make microscopes powerful enough we should see in the sulphide of iron the atoms of its two constituents." (Page 106.)

Putting this passage in common language it amounts to this: We hold every chemical combination to be equivalent to a mixture. But facts are against us; especially that stubborn fact that in the combination no trace, whatever, of the components is to be seen or observed, in spite of all efforts to the contrary; whereas in the mixture

we can easily and distinctly see the atoms composing it standing side by side.

Still *our atomic theory demands* that we should be able to distinguish the components even of the combination. What is to be done? Why let us lay the fault at the door of the microscope. If we could make the microscope powerful enough, we should certainly see, in the chemical combination each distinct atom of the components lying side by side in happy fellowship.

Some simple-minded mortal might ask: if no change whatever takes place in the constituents of a chemical compound but just a change of place, if they are in no way affected as to structure, form, shape, or size, why, in the name of common sense, should it require a more powerful microscope to distinguish them in the combination any more than is necessary to distinguish them in the mixture?

One must have very powerful digestive faculty in the matter of modern science. The very fact of its being modern, up to the times, in full harmony with the giant steps of progress and evolution, settles the question. On its testimony you must stifle the clamors of your reason and common sense and accept blindly whatever its advocates are condescending enough to place before you.

But the explanation we are commenting upon flatly contradicts the most universally accepted principles of reason.

The effect of a chemical combination is a homogeneous compact mass, a new body, in the truest and strictest sense of the word. For this compound exhibits and manifests new properties and new operations, which differ from and oftentimes are contrary to those of each of the constituents of the compound. On this chemists of every opinion and of every school are agreed without a contradictory voice. Now, we ask: how do we discover and find out the nature of a theory? Assuredly, from its attributes, faculties, and operations. This, for the simple reason that a being acts and must act as it is, in conformity with its essence and nature. Nobody ever dreamt that a thing will act contrary to its nature; for the nature of a being is just its first principle of operation, and it would be the height of absurdity to suppose that it followed a bend in utter conflict with itself. Hence the saying, that *operatio sequitur esse.* This principle is admitted by scientists and acted upon by them, and is not merely the doctrine of metaphysicians, for whom the author alluded to by us has such instinctive horror. It is upon the strength of this principle that chemists, not being able to observe the nature of things in itself, build the essential difference between one body

and another, be it simple or compound. One body is observed to manifest certain operations producing certain peculiar effects; another body is found to exhibit different or contrary operations and results; science on the ground that a being acts as it is, and that a different or contrary set of operations and effect indicates difference or opposition of nature in the cause, comes to the conclusion that there are substances and bodies specifically different from or contrary to each other.

Difference of operations, therefore, argues difference of nature in the agent. If, then, in the chemical combination, we have a compound wholly dissimilar in operation from that of the component parts, we must necessarily conclude that the compound is of different nature from that which the components exhibited before the combination.

It will be said that science maintains that the component parts in the combination must remain, because it is demonstrated that the weight of the mass of the compound is equal to that of the constituent bodies.

Certainly something must remain of the constituent bodies, otherwise we should no longer have a change or transformation, but a destruction of the constituent bodies. But what can that be? Certainly not the constituent bodies precisely and exactly in the same conditions in which they existed before the combination. Certainly not a new and different arrangement and grouping which has supervened, and which does not alter or affect the bodies in any real sense but leaves them whole and intact as previously to the composition, for all that does not account for the production and generation of a new body with different properties and operations.

What then must be said to remain? The general material substratum which enters in the composition of all bodies. The chemical agent acting upon the component bodies effaces and destroys the present real substantial form in which they exist and from the material substratum common to all bodies, which is ever permanent and imperishable, extracts, or to express it in the scientific language commonly used, disengages a new form which reduces them to one solid homogeneous mass—a new body.

This is the only possible explanation of the phenomenon of chemical combination consistent with all the facts and results of chemistry, and in absolute harmony with reason and common sense.

But it is exactly the explanation of the scholastic system as to

the essential constitution of bodies, as must be apparent to all those who have followed our demonstration.

In that theory it is held that two are the principles absolutely necessary to constitute what all mankind calls a body. One, which officiates as permanent imperishable substratum, entering into the composition of all bodies. This principle is held to be of itself shorn of all special native attribute or operation, but capable of assuming or receiving any special nature or attribute, retaining, even after having undergone a special nature, the capacity to lose it under proper and adequate influence of agents and forces, and to assume any other kind of nature and attributes. This is the passive principle called Primary Matter.

The other is the active principle, true and real and substantial, which impresses upon the primary matter a special nature and properties, subsistence, individuality and activity, as such. This principle is the Form.

The substantial change and transformation going on in bodies, a fact of daily and hourly occurrence, can be explained in no other system. This transformation, as we have repeatedly remarked, requires to be real and substantial, otherwise it cannot be accounted for consistently with the facts observed by Chemistry. There must at the same time be something left of the former bodies which enter into the combination ; otherwise it would be no longer a combination, but utter destruction, and the fact that the compound's weight is equal to the sum of the weight of the components would remain inexplicable. The schoolmen's theory explains and accounts for everything. For it teaches that a substantial change can be effected in bodies inasmuch as under a proper agent they are deprived of a certain true, real form, and from the remaining imperishable material substratum underlying all bodies a new form is educed or evoked, and hence a new body is constructed, presenting nature properties, operations wholly at variance with those of the constituents. We have purposely used the scholastic word *educed*, for the opponents of the peripatetic system have indulged in any amount of merriment over that expression. They have laughed at the idea that one could extract new forms from matter as if it were a magical box, by opening which all sorts of wonderful things might be drawn forth. But with what reason they have done this we shall see. The word is necessarily metaphorical, as we are, according to the condition of human laguage, bound to make use of words drawn from sensible representations, and therefore relating or alluding to some sensible phenomenon.

But in this we have a goodly company. The word *disengage* has passed into common use among scientific men of all kinds, and especially of chemists, to express how a new phenomenon is produced in certain bodies under the action of physical and chemical agents. That expression surely is no better than the word educed, drawn forth or extricated, used by the scholastics. Both are metaphorical, and both convey the idea as well as human language permits. And those who permit themselves to laugh at the expression of the scholastics, actuated by the feeling of supercilious scientific superiority, forget that they are availing themselves of an equivalent expression, and are not aware that in laughing the schoolmen to scorn, they are turning the laugh against true science and its professors.

We could prove the truth of the theory we are advocating from the principal properties of bodies, such as extension, resistance, impenetrability, activity, and crystallization. But we have no room to develop more than one of them, and shall select the most important one among them, that is *Extension*.

To form an idea of real extension various other concepts are necessary. First, we must conceive something which is possessed of that which, for want of better expression, we shall call parts. For it is evident that without supposing a mass made up of, or resulting from a multiplicity of parts, one standing outside the other, we could never begin to form the concept of extension.

In the second place we must conceive a continuity in the parts of the mass which appears as expanded and extended. But what is meant by continuity? The better to define it is well to state the difference which exists between continuity and contiguity. The first implies the idea of a mass supposed to be composed of parts one outside the other, but which parts considered as something really definite or distinct from each other in the bosom of that mass, do not really exist, but are a creation of our mind. Contiguity on the other hand conveys the idea of a mass made up of parts one outside the other; but these parts have a real definite distinct existence in the bosom of the being and only touch each other by their extremities. In other words if a mass is given made of really definite and distinct parts in juxtaposition to each we say that those parts are contiguous and that the mass offers the phenomenon of contiguity. On the other hand let a mass be given the parts of which have no real definite existence of their own but appear so welded together that the extremity of one is the beginning of the other, and we have the phenomenon of continuity.

The idea of extension then implies a multiplicity of parts one lying outside the other, and at the same time continuous to each other. Without this multiplicity and continuity we could never account for the perception of extension, a fact of daily experience with us.

Now in order that this multiplicity of parts might yield a compact continuous whole a principle is necessary which so informs penetrates and masters all the parts, and brings them together as to result in a perfect unity potentially divisible, but in reality undivided. This principle must be simple and the source of activity in the body. It must be simple otherwise it would be itself a body. It must be active to give unity to the being.

To explain then the property of extension in bodies a double principle is necessary. The first which may account for the multiplicity of parts and their expansion. The second which may give unity and indivisibility to those parts so that all may result into one compact continuous body. The first is matter the other is the form. These are both real and substantial and hence account for all the requirements necessary to establish real extension, and at the same time eschew the great difficulty prevalent against any system which attempts to explain the extension of bodies by means of any other supposition except that of a *substantial extended substratum* brought into unity by a *simple substantial principle.*

It may be objected to us that the Peripatetic system does not avoid the difficulty, but leaves it whole and intact, for if it be conceded that a body is truly extended and continuous it becomes absolutely necessary to admit that a small particle of it is infinite as containing an infinite number of parts. In fact, given real extension in a body we must needs grant that it may be divided into smaller bodies, also extended, and these in their turn being so, may be cut up into bodies yet smaller, and so on ad infinitum.

St. Thomas has foreseen the difficulty, and has replied to it as he is wont to do. And to clearly state his answer we must distinguish between the mathematical continuous and the physical continuous. The first is the continual quantity mentally abstracted from the substance or real body which is the subject of the same. The second is the real body or substance with the quantity of which it is the subject.

The question may be raised whether both one and the other are made up of infinite parts. We answer, in the mathematical continuous there are no actual parts either finite or infinite in number ;

for the simple reason that it is not a discreet quantity, that is a quantity the component parts of which have a separate and distinct existence. But it is potentially infinite in number.

The physical continuous has no real parts, either finite or infinite, but is potentially capable of finite parts.

The first statement is proven by the remark that, be the supposed quantity ever so small by the very fact of its being essentially extended, it can never by division, be brought to that state that on one side there may be left an extended part and on the other an unextended or mathematical point, or that the last extended point may be divided into two mathematical points. A continuous quantity, therefore, considered as such, must be essentially divisible into parts also divisible, and we can never look upon a further division as impossible. Consequently, the mathematical continuous is potentially divisible ad infinitum. But it is not so of the physical continuous. It is not pure quantity. It is the *solid substance* on which, as its subject, quantity is found to lean. Hence such quantity could not be divided without dividing the substance in which it resides. If we confined our consideration to the quantity alone as abstract from the substance which it modifies, the continuous would be divisible ad infinitum potentially, but not actually. But, regarding the continuous as a substance, it is not and cannot be divisible ad infinitum, either potentially or actually. The reason of this two-fold impossibility arises from the very essence of the substance and concrete nature of the being. For every substance must be regarded in a two-fold aspect ; in its intrinsic nature and essence, and in its extern nation or irradiation, so to speak, inasmuch as it extends to occupy space. The latter takes its origin from the substance itself as a force or power of the same. And it can easily be conceived how a corporal substance may be reduced to a minimum degree of extension, so as to have no longer the power to occupy space, or to prevent another substance from taking its own identical place.

Hence, whether a body attempted to be divided be an elementary substance or a composite body we must necessarily, at least in thought, arrive at a limit beyond which the division cannot be carried unless the body ceases to have the virtue of power of extending itself, or of preventing another body from occupying its own identical place. In other words, without its ceasing to be continuous. "Corpus," says St. Thomas, "quod est magnitudo completa dupliciter sumitur, scilicet mathematice, secundum quod consideratur in eo sola quantitas, et naturaliter secundum quod con-

sideratur in eo materia et forma. Et de corpore quidem naturali; quod non possit esse infinitum in actu manifestum est. Nam omne corpus naturale aliquam formam substantialem habet determinatam; cum igitur ad formam naturalem consequantur accidentia, necesse est quod ad determinatam formam naturalem consequantur determinata accidentia, inter quæ est quantitas. Unde omne corpus naturale habet determinatam quantitatem, et in magis et minus." (St. Th.: S. 1a p. qu. : 7, art. 3.)

We conclude our demonstration by adding that the scholastic theory has the support of all those naturalists who admit the atomodynamic system to explain the essential principles of bodies.

This system, which maintains that atoms are something really active and extended, if it means anything, amounts to this, that a force is essential to the primitive atom, that without such a force it would neither exist nor be extended. Hence this force must enter into the very essence of the atom, for that thing is surely essential to a being, without which it could not exist. On the other hand, this force cannot be conceived except as simple and unextended. Hence, according to this system, the primitive atom, which is extended and also endowed with continuity and resistance, must necessarily be the result of an extended reality and of a force from which its properties and laws depend. Both constituents are necessarily required for its existence. Because without the extended reality we could not conceive force, not even in a single point of space. Without force extension itself would lose all reality.

Now, who can fail to see that such a system coincides perfectly with the scholastic system of matter and substantial form? The extended reality, which cannot exist by itself alone without force, and the extension of which vanishes without the action of the simple principle, exhibits and represents the scholastic idea of matter, the source of extension, but of itself indeterminate, and incapable of subsisting without form. Force, on the other hand, necessary to the first existence of matter, represents the substantial form.

Hence the system we have been defending can lay claim not only to the extrinsic authority of so many eminent scientists who have supported the atomodynamic system, but also to all those reasons, absolutely irrefutable, on which it is grounded.

Professor Cooke, of Harvard, who is a chemist of the school of the author of "Modern and Mediæval Cosmology," feels the great and momentous weight of the atomodynamic theory, and says: "I must confess that I am rather drawn to that view of nature which

has favor with many of the most eminent physicists of the present time, and which sees in the cosmos, besides mind, only two essentially distinct beings, namely, matter and energy ; which regards all matter as one, and all energy as one, and which refers the qualities of substances to the affections of the one *substratum*, modified by the varying play of forces." (The Atomic Theory, page 102. Appleton, N. Y., 1881.)

J. DE CONCILIO.

THE ASPIRANT TO THE PRIESTHOOD.

By the Late Dr. Francis Hettinger.

[The right of translation of this series of Letters has been purchased exclusively for the pages of the *American Ecclesiastical Review*.]

The following "Letters" to a young Seminarian were not published until after the death of their illustrious writer, which occurred in January, 1890. They treat in systematic order, although in the familiar form of epistolary correspondence, the chief points of the ecclesiastical training to the holy ministry, and with special reference to the requirements of modern society.

The priest can never be, in the ordinary sense of the word, a man of the world; his very position places him above it. Nevertheless, he cannot always make that position felt by sanctity of life alone. There are men who will remain unmoved by religious sentiment or the convincing force of truth, yet who are at times attracted by the culture of mind or tastes which they recognize in a priest, and which open to him a way of fulfilling his ministry toward those who would else remain in the shadow of death.

Dr. Hettinger, during the long years which he spent in training the clergy, recognized this need whilst he was in frequent touch with the social elements that most influence the education of a nation. The topics which he treats in these letters appeal to the Catholic priesthood the world over, and his natural breadth of view, emphasized by an exceptional experience, makes them of as much practical worth to the candidates for the priestly mission in America as they are for those to whom the author meant in the first place to address himself. The order of subjects is as follows:—VOCATION, PREPARATORY TRAINING, CLASSICAL STUDIES, PHILOSOPHY, THOMISTIC PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY AND THE NATURAL SCIENCES, THE ARTS, THE HIGHER SEMINARY, ASCETICAL TRAINING, THE STUDY OF THEOLOGY, APOLOGETICS, DOGMATIC THEOLOGY, MORAL THEOLOGY, CANON LAW, BIBLICAL STUDIES, CHURCH HISTORY, STUDY OF THE CHRISTIAN FATHERS, PASTORAL AND PRACTICAL THEOLOGY, CATECHETICAL INSTRUCTION, HOMILETICS, LITURGY.

In his treatment of these themes the author largely mingles the belletristic with the didactic element. This may seem to some a defect, whilst others will consider it a decided advantage, inasmuch as it opens many secondary useful and agreeable sources of information, which of itself tends to the elevation and refinement of thought and expression.

As for the translation, we cannot pretend to anything like the characteristic warmth and poetic grace of the original. Any attempt to an even approximately literal rendition would lead to the adoption of an artificial style, which is never more repulsive than when applied to spiritual themes. We were obliged, therefore, to use a certain freedom of judgment and expression throughout. In many places we shall have to cut out portions, not only where merely local or individual references, which do not appeal to the sympathy of the English reader, are introduced, but also where the mode of thought, or rather of thinking, differs from our own. The entire mental and spiritual constitution of the German, as expressed in his idiom, requires, so to speak, a welding in order to adapt it to the genius of English, and more especially, of American thought and speech. If we should seem to have exceeded at times in the use of this freedom, so as to lessen the merit of the original, our only apology is to be found in the desire to be practical.

I.

The True Idealism—Temporal and Eternal—Pessimism and the Christian View—A Mark of Vocation.

MY DEAR YOUNG FRIEND :

Your letters have not only shown me marks of absolute confidence but they have also allowed me a clear insight into your soul. You have had doubts and difficulties; and whilst ever longing for higher and nobler things, your path seemed obscured by darksome clouds. But have courage, my dear friend. These are only the nebulous mists gathering at early morn before the rising of the sun. Soon the light will ascend, and its strong, warm rays will dissipate the uncertain atmosphere and let you look clearly into your own inmost soul. Was not a light given you even as your birthright to guide you from your cradle through the devious paths of this world to your heavenly destiny?

Call it reason or knowledge or that native longing of the will to possess the perfect good—all three combined in varying degrees offer unto every man their illumining rays to lead him on to the source of all grace, of all that is spiritual.

Nor is that fluctuating, restless yearning of your soul for something nobler far away and undefined, without its meaning. To-day it rouses you to a joyous confidence at the recital of generous sacri-

fices made by men, who, like yourself, were doomed to struggle against earth ; to-morrow you are cast down with disappointment at yourself and others, when the ideal which you had before you proves but a fancied reality. And yet you cannot live without ideals. "Res contempta homo est, nisi se supra humana elevaverit." This yearning within you, this mingling of joy and sadness all in one which holds your soul spellbound in the hour of affliction, is nothing else than the state of a heart wherein the principle of love is struggling unto perfect development. Everything will depend on the character of this development. Plato's ingenious myth wherein he pictures *Eros* as the offspring of *Poros* and *Penia* is a truth exemplified in the history of each single soul. Does not the eye turn naturally upward to the skies, when the heart, abandoned by the fickle promises of earth, finds within naught but weakness and doubt and sin, and yet, above all else, the necessity of a sustaining power? Such is the force of heavenly attraction, and the love which yields to it is the inborn love of the child of God. But the love of earth casts down its eye and finds its happiness below. L'uno tira al cielo e l'altra a terra tira.

Sensual love fancies to have found true joy ; but it is as in a dream, and on awaking the soul feels the more keenly its void, and disappointment makes it smart with a hopeless pain. The love which fixes on heaven outlasts the pleasant phantasies of its first stage and gains in eager desire with every new glimpse of that undying beauty which rests above the clouds, whereas the worldling feeds on momentary joy growing dull and insipid as the years drag on amid sullen remorse and despair.

Keep then, my dear young friend, your eye with steady gaze upon that rising light on high. It will lead you on to the enjoyment of that eternal beauty on which Angelic Hosts have looked for endless centuries never wearying in chants of grateful praise.

From your letters I am convinced of the purity of your motives, your earnestness of purpose and, I may add, the cleanness of your heart. Happy the youth whose early years have not been tainted by grave sins. Purity of heart is like precious ointment which spreads its sweet odors over all the faculties of the soul ; it somehow acts in a chastening way upon the intellect, and makes it capable of clearly perceiving truth, whilst it elevates the affections to seek only the noblest ideals for their object. Ah yes ! "The clean of heart shall see God." It is true even of earthly understanding. The gifted yet unfortunate Sainte Beuve says somewhere "Dissipation

is a strong dissolvent of faith and it engrafts into the soul a more or less decided skepticism. The sense of melancholy which proceeds, like an odor of death, from the bosom of earthly pleasures, and the restless weariness which frightens whilst it enervates, do not merely affect our senses but react in a certain sense upon our judgment. The principle of certitude becomes in course of time deranged and breeds confusion in the reason." He spoke from experience.

You tell me that the thought of death, the uncertainty of earthly hopes and the perishable frailty of all things round about you have of late made a deep impression upon your soul. You ask whether the word of the Angelic Doctor "Modicum est hoc totum spatium quo praesens pervolat saeculum" may not apply also to the aspirations of your soul, so that, as in the case of many men, the heart would in time grow dry and weary. These thoughts seem to attest a lack of confidence in the immortal purpose of our being, and yet I am hardly disposed to blame you for indulging them. St. Thomas saw in this feeling of insecurity rather a mark of the in-working grace of God. All those great minds whose genius we admire in the production of masterpieces in letters or arts, have given expression to this conviction of the insufficiency of earthly elements for the realization of man's highest ideals. Witness the strains of Homer and Sophocles, or, in Christian times, those of Dante,[1] Shakespeare,[2] Michael Angelo.[3]

The saintly youths who, following the generous impulse of a chivalrous nature, renounced the temporal advantages of society that they might devote themselves to a loftier pursuit of heavenly treasures, were never found to yield to the *tædium vitæ* in the same way as the worldling does. If they were sad their sadness had

1 Because mine eyes can never have their fill
Of looking at my lady's lovely face,
I will so fix my gaze
That I may become blessed beholding her.
Vita Nuova—Rossetti's Transl.

2 When I have seen by Time's fell hand defaced
The rich-proud cost of out-worn buried age:
When I have seen such interchange of state,
Or state itself confounded to decay;
Ruin has taught me thus to ruminate—
That time will come and take my love away.
This thought is as a death which cannot choose,
But weep, to have that which it fears to lose.
Sonnets, LXIV.

3 Veggio ben, che della vita sono
Ventura e grazia l'ore ben corte
Che l'umana miseria han fin per la morte.

nothing of melancholy or of that gloomy fear of death which follows the exciting pleasures of earth. "Tristitia mundi mortem operatur" says the Apostle.[1] The mourning of the "blessed," of whom our Lord speaks, is full of peace and sweet tranquillity. Like the floating dew of heaven it fructifies, whereas the dejection which succeeds the false joys of the world, like the miasmic vapors from below, poisons and kills the struggling germ of life.

But if it is true that all that which the earth holds of sweetest gifts must needs pass away, are we, therefore, to account it of no value to us? By no means. Certainly we are not to argue with the philosophers of old that the limited cup of pleasure is to be quickly drained lest its contents evaporate ere we can fully enjoy them. Nor could we endorse the severe but shallow reasoning of the modern Buddhist or the stoic Pessimist, who sum up the uses of life in the precept: Endure and hail death as a liberator. This is a sad philosophy, for it robs man of his truest ideal and destroys the noblest aspirations of the human heart.

If the world with its show of good things disappoints us, it is because we take the curtain, that hides the real good from superficial view, as the fulfillment of the soul's yearning after perfect beauty and happiness. Those objects which strike the outward sense are but the symbols of an inward perfection, which alone can satisfy our nature. Lift the veil and you will find that for which your inmost soul does long.

Nurture, then, within you this aspiration. It is part and indication of your truest life perpetuating the youth of your heart. Have you never met men with hoary heads yet youthful faces, men who are never wholly sad and still not frivolous, but whose souls seem to soar upward on the wings of higher hopes than those which can disappoint the creatures of earth? On the other hand you will find men young in years, who from the very threshold of their boyhood seem to take away a load that makes them droop and bend with weariness of life. These are they who have early lost or been deprived of noble aspirations. It is true that the wordly man considers the pursuit of an ideal perfection as folly. "Invicem insanire videmur," says St. Jerome. The Governor Felix thought St. Paul but a visionary whom his very learning had made mad.[2] But are there not others who, having drained the world's reality, found it impossible to satiate their thirst for happiness, and who in turning to the higher fountain gained peace of soul and joy un-

1 II Cor., 7, 10. 2 Acts, 26, 24.

quenchable in the pursuit of the heavenly ideal. Listen to St. Augustin:[1] "Turn us toward Thee, O Lord of Hosts, show us Thy countenance and we shall be saved! (Ps. 79, 4.) For whithersoever the soul of man may turn, unless to Thee, it is affixed to sorrow, yea though it is affixed to beauteous things without Thee and without itself. But they were not, unless they were from Thee. They rise and set, and by rising they begin as it were to be, and they grow that they may become perfect, and when perfect they wax old and perish; and all wax not old, yet all perish. Therefore, when they rise and tend to be, the more rapidly they grow that they may be, so much the more they hasten not to be. This is the way of them. . . . Hearken then. The Word itself invokes thee to return; and there is the place of rest imperturbable, where love is not abandoned if itself abandoneth not. Behold these things pass away that others may succeed them . . . but do I depart anywhere, says the word of God. There fix the habitation of thy rest, O my soul now at length that thou art weary of the world's deceit. Commit to truth what truth has granted thee, and nothing shalt thou lose; and thy wounds shall be healed, and what is sore and sick in thee shall be restored and cured, and shall not perish with the things which pass away, but bide forever with the everlasting God."

It is then in God that we must seek our permanent satisfaction. He alone is sufficient for the void within us, who fills all things, and without whom we must remain needy and restless. "What is it that I love? I have asked the earth and it answered: It is not I. I have asked the sea and the abyss and they replied: We are not thy God. I have asked the heavens, the sun, and moon and stars, and they all answered me: We are not the God whom thou seekest. Then I called out to all the things without and around me: Tell me something of my God, whom, you say, you are not, tell me something of Him? And they returned with mighty voice: He has created us."[2] But if these earthly things are perishable they show that which is immortal; they quicken our search for that which lies within; they give impulse to thought and action which will live forever. The gilt-edged cloud may darken our path, but yet it guards and intensifies the hope of seeing the fair sun that hides behind it for a time.

Herein then lies, my friend, the value of the things that are but dust in many shapes. The thought of eternity behind them gives

1 Confess. iv. 10, 11. 2 Ps. 99. 3. Aug. l. c. 10, 6.

them price and worth ; only when you separate them from the central body which makes their attraction do you render them worthless. Science, arts, religion, all that is fair in life or lends it dignity, has its precious value to him that knows the use thereof. To this does all knowledge tend. From the individual and accidental it proceeds to the universal and to that which contains the first and final cause of all existence. Aristotle defines pure wisdom as theology. [1] He was right, for the idea of truth as the object of the wise man's inquiry leads of necessity to the origin and the author of truth, just as the notion of good, and that of being, force the mind toward the recognition of perfect good and an absolute independent being, which is God.

Yet mere speculative theology cannot be our ultimate aim. It does not, as such, answer to the necessity of our being. Although this noblest occupation of the intellect proposes to lead the human mind, link by link, along the chain of finite phenomena until it reaches God, there are many gaps which reason and the evidence of sense are unable to bridge over. We may trace the sunlight to its source by the broken rays that reach us from the clouded sky above or by the reflected glare on some smooth form below. Still it is but an assurance of light far short of the reality that shines out from the royal orb. Nor could we bear with our shaded eyes the full rich splendor of the heavenly sun, to which we turn for light. And is not this itself a proof of some radical need in our present condition, since the limitation which binds our senses and our reason does not extend to the desire for a full and perfect knowledge of truth, which is ever present within us. It points to a higher source of evidence which is both to secure and perfect human science. Socrates felt this need, [2] and Plato, where he speaks of the λόγος θεῖός τις, [3] and the Christian recognizes this source in revelation. Thus *faith* becomes the *complement* of human science. All true science simply leads up to the gate which faith alone can eventually open into the temple of absolute truth. Human knowledge gives us but a foretaste of that knowledge which surpasses all the wisdom of earth.

Mark then the path of genuine science. It considers this world, notes the results of rational investigation through the constant changes from life to life and to decay ; and convinced of the insuffi-

1 Alcibiad., II. 2 Phæd., p. 85.

3 Nomen simpliciter sapientis illi reservatur, cujus consideratio circa finem Universi versatur, qui etiam est Universitatis principium. *St. Thom. contr. G. I. 13; secund Aristot. Metaphys. I, 1.*

ciency of that which is controllable by sense and reason, hearkens to the divine voice, which in the light of eternal existence gives certainty to man's unceasing search. Thus are we led, step by step, from physical science to that of positive and supernatural theology. Of this we shall treat in the following letters.

This distaste, therefore, regarding the things of earth, allied to a longing for what is higher and seemingly beyond your reach, need not discourage you. Nay, it should cause you to rejoice with habitual gratitude to God. And if it does this you may take it as a token of your vocation; for St. Thomas lays great stress upon habitual joy as being a sign that God is within and that He lifts the soul preparatory to embracing it. Cultivate these evidences of your calling to the sacred ministry. Let not the noise round about you drown the subdued whisperings of love which come from the Holy Spirit, and defend the sanctuary of your heart from the encroachments of the world. Do so by being watchful in prayer.

CONFERENCES.

LENTEN QUERIES.

Qu. The Lenten Indult in force in the United States allows the use of *lard* (adeps suilli) in place of butter for the preparation of Lenten food. Does this privilege extend to the days of abstinence throughout the year?

Resp. The common interpretation of theologians is that the *usage*, which has occasioned the legislation by way of special Indult, also regulates its legitimate application. Hence we would unhesitatingly answer the above query in the affirmative. We know that such is the opinion of authorities like P. Sabetti, who, if they do not state the matter explicitly in their Moral Theology, simply indicate that in the matter of local usage which regulates special legislation, no general statement can be made.

Qu. Is *clam-chowder* allowed for days of abstinence and fast? Please answer. (Query sent twice.)

Resp. That depends on the quality. Not versed in the details of the culinary art, and yet wishing to satisfy our correspondent, we consulted an approved cook-book :

Clam-Chowder.

50 clams,
1 pound *veal*,
½ pound *bacon* or *ham*, &c., &c.

Line the bottom of the sauce-pan with the bacon or ham cut into dice, &c., &c.

THE "HAIL HOLY QUEEN" AFTER MASS.

Qu. Should the people join the celebrant in reciting the "Hail Holy Queen" after Low Mass?

Resp. It is not necessary, although where the congregation unite in well-trained chorus with the priest it helps devotion and gives edification. The prescribed rubric *recitandæ sunt preces alternatim cum populo* refers to the prayer as a whole.

A PRIVILEGED ALTAR.

Qu. I want to get an altar *privileged*. Will you be kind enough to tell me how I must go about it? If a regular *form* is to be filled for application, please send me one.

Resp. Our Bishops have the faculty of granting one privileged altar for every parish church in their diocese. "Declarandi privilegiatum in qualibet ecclesia suæ diœcesis unum altare, dummodo aliud privilegiatum non adsit," &c.

The phrase *dummodo aliud privilegiatum non adsit* does not exclude the right of a second privileged altar in the same church, provided it has been granted under a separate title.

The ordinary privilege for the parish church is obtained from the Bishop in the following or similar form:

Illme. Rme. Domine,—N. Rector Parochiae N. hujus dioecesis, pro ecclesia sua parochiali sancti N. atque in ea sito summo altari, sancto N. dedicato, petit humiliter privilegium quotidianum a Clemente P XIII omnibus ecclesiis parochialibus benigne concessum.

This privilege is applicable to *all churches and chapels in which parochial functions* are performed. (Decr. auth. n. 219 ad 3 et 4.) Where a separate privileged altar is desired under a separate title application is to be made to the S. Congregation (*Segretaria dei Brevi*, Via di S. Apollinare n. 8 Roma, Italia). The petition must be endorsed by the Bishop of the diocese and contain the following statements:

1. Name of the Church and Diocese. 2. Reason for asking the privilege. 3. For how long this privilege is desired. 4. Whether the church is a regular parish church or a chapel, etc. 5. Title of the altar. These items are embodied in a form similar to the one given above in addressing the Bishop.

ANALECTA.

LENTEN INDULT.

Apostolic Letter dispensing the Faithful from Fast and Abstinence on account of the Influenza (grip).

The character and symptoms of the malady called *Influenza*, which prevails throughout Europe and in other countries, has aroused the solicitude of the Sovereign Pontiff. Our Most Holy Father, Leo XIII., concerned not only for the welfare of souls but also for the physical well-being of his children, is moved by the prevalence of the above-named disease to a desire of affording all possible help for the lessening of its evil influence. He therefore avails himself of the offices of the S. Council of the Roman Inquisition and in virtue of his Apostolic authority grants to all the Archbishops, Bishops and Ordinaries of every land where the aforementioned disease prevails, the faculty of dispensing the faithful under their charge from the obligation of fasting and abstinence, so long as, in their judgment, the state of public health requires it.

His Holiness however wishes, that, while the faithful avail themselves of this privilege, they perform with great earnestness special works of piety which may move the mercy of God. For since it is plain that the many evils which presently afflict us, are to be attributed to the divine justice which punishes men for the corruption of morals and the multitude of transgressions which exceed all bounds, His Holiness exhorts the faithful to appease the anger of God by prayer, by works of mercy toward the poor, by assiduous attendance at the public devotions in their churches, and by the devout frequenting of the sacraments.

✠ R. Card. Monaco,

(*Ex S. Rom. et Univ. Inquisitione, Romæ, die 14 Jan. 1892.*)

DUBIUM DE SCAPULARIUM IMPOSITIONE.

Rector Decanus Ecclesiae B. M. V. a Berchorio, Diocesis Pictaviensis, huic S. Congñi Indulgentiarum haec quae sequuntur exponit:

Aliquando impositio Scapularium ab Ecclesia approbatorum, ita pro fre-

quentia populi protrahitur, ut fiat cum assistentium taedio et Sacerdotis defatigatione, praesertim post primam puerorum Communionem vel exercitia Missionum, quia tunc permulti accedunt ad hos sacros habitus suscipiendos ; quae praecaverentur incommoda si Sacerdoti liceret una tantum vice dicere formulam numero plurali, imponendo successive, sed nulla interposita mora, scapulare fidelibus praesentibus ; quod quidem licitum videtur cum adsit unio moralis inter formulae prolationem et impositionem scapularium et sic efficeretur unicus et completus actus.

Unde supradictus Rector sequens dubium dirimendum proponit :

Utrum liceat Sacerdoti, in impositione Scapularium, ab Ecclesia approbatorum, omnibus rite peractis, dicere semel numero plurali formulam : *Accipite fratres, vel sorores*, &c., imponendo successive et sine interruptione scapulare omnibus praesentibus : vel potius formula numero sigulari pro singulis sit repetenda ?

Sacra Congregatio Indulgentiis Sacrisque Reliquiis praeposita exhibito dubio respondit :

Affirmative quoad primam partem ; negative quoad secundam uti decretum est in una Valentinensi, die 5 Februarii 1841, ad dubium IV.

Datum ex Secretaria eiusdem S. Congregationis, die 18 Aprilis, 1891.

Ios. Card. D'Annibale, Praefectus.

L. ✠ S.

Alexander Archiep. Nicopol., Secretarius.

(*S Cong. Indulg. et S. Relig. 18 Ap. 1891.*)

DECRETUM DE APERITIONE CONSCIENTIAE.

SUPERIORIBUS HAUD EXIGENDA, DEQUE JURIBUS CONFESSARII QUOAD MONIALES ET INSTITUTA VIRO RUM LAICORUM.

Quemadmodum omnium rerum humanarum, quantumvis honestæ sanctæque in se sint : ita et legum sapienter conditarum ea conditio est, ut ab hominibus ad impropria et aliena ex abusu traduci ac pertrahi valeant ; ac propterea quandoque fit, ut intentum a legislatoribus finem haud amplius assequantur : imo et aliquando, ut contrarium sortiantur effectum.

Idque dolendum vel maxime est obtigisse quoad leges plurium Congregationum, Societatum aut Institutorum sive mulierum quæ vota simplicia aut solemnia nuncupant, sive virorum profcssione ac regimine penitus laicorum ; quandoquidem aliquoties in illorum Constitutionibus conscientiæ manifestatio permissa fuerat, ut facilius alumni arduam perfectionis viam ab expertis Superioribus in dubiis addiscerent ; e contra a nonnullis ex his intima conscientiæ scrutatio, quæ unice Sacramento Pœnitentiæ reservata est, inducta fuit. Itidem in Constitutionibus ad tramitem SS. Canonum præscriptum fuit, ut Sacramentalis Confessio in hujusmodi Communitatibus fieret respectivis Confessariis ordinariis et extraordinariis ; aliunde Superiorum arbitrium eo usque devenit, ut subditis aliquem extraordinarium Confessarium denegaverint, etiam in casu quo, ut propriæ conscientiæ consulerent, eo valde indigebant. Indita denique eis fuit discretionis ac prudentiæ norma, ut suos subditos rite recteque quoad peculiares pœnitentias ac alia pietatis opera dirigerent ; sed et hæc per abusionem extensa

in id etiam extitit, ut eis ad Sacram Synaxim accedere vel pro lubitu permiserint, vel omnino interdum prohibuerint. Hinc factum est, ut hujusmodi dispositiones, quæ ad spiritualem alumnorum profectum, et ad unitatis pacem et concordiam in Communitatibus servandam fovendamque salutariter ac sapienter constitutæ jam fuerant, haud raro in animarum discrimen, in conscientiarum anxietatem, ac insuper in externæ pacis turbationem versæ fuerint, ceu subditorum recursus et querimoniæ passim ad S. Sedem interjectæ evidentissime comprobant.

Quare SSmus D. N. Leo divina providentia Papa XIII, pro ea qua præstat erga lectissimam hanc sui gregis portionem peculiari sollicitudine, in Audientia habita a me Cardinali Præfecto S. Congregationis Episcoporum et Regularium negotiis et consultationibus præpositæ die decima quarta Decembris 1890, omnibus sedulo diligenterque perpensis, hæc quæ sequuntur voluit, constituit atque decrevit.

I. Sanctitas Sua irritat, abrogat, et nullius in posterum roboris declarat quascumque dispositiones Constitutionum, piarum Societatum. Institutorum mulierum sive votorum simplicium sive solemnium, nec non virorum omnimode laicorum, etsi dictæ Constitutiones approbationem ab Apostolica Sede retulerint in forma quacumque etiam quam aiunt specialissimam, in eo scilicet, quod cordis et conscientiæ intimam manifestationem quovis modo ac nomine respiciunt. Ita propterea serio injungit Moderatricibus hujusmodi Institutorum, Congregationum ac Societatum, ut ex propriis Constitutionibus, Directoriis, ac Manualibus præfatæ dispositiones omnino deleantur penitusque expungantur. Irritat pariter ac delet quoslibet ea de re usus et consuetudines etiam immemorabiles.

II. Districte insuper prohibet memoratis Superioribus ac Superiorissis, cujuscumque gradus et præeminentiæ sint, ne personas sibi subditas inducere pertentent directe aut indirecte, præcepto, consilio, timore, minis, aut blanditiis ad hujusmodi manifestationem conscientiæ sibi peragendam; subditisque converso præcipit, ut Superioribus majoribus denuncient Superiores minores, qui eos ad in inducere audeant; et si agatur de Moderatore vel Moderatrice Generali denunciatio huic S. Congregationi ab iis fieri debeat.

III. Hoc autem minime impedit, quominus subditi libere ac ultro aperire suum animum Superioribus valeant, ad effectum ab illorum prudentia in dubiis ac anxietatibus consilium et directionem obtinendi pro virtutem acquisitione ac perfectionis progressu.

IV. Præterea, firmo remanente quoad Confessarios ordinarios et extraordinarios Communitatem quod a Sacrosancto Concilio Tridentino præscribitur in *Sess. 25, Cap. 10 de Regul.*, et a *S. M. Benedicti XIV* statuitur in Constitutione quæ incipit "Pastoralis curæ:" Sanctitas Sua Præsules Superioresque admonet, ne extraordinarium denegent subditis Confessarium quoties ut propriæ conscientiæ consulant ad id subditi adigantur, quin iidem Superiores ullo modo petitionis rationem inquirant, aut ægre id ferre demonstrent. Ac ne evanida tam provida dispositio fiat, Ordinarios exhortatur, ut in locis propriæ Diœceseos, in quibus Mulierum Communitates existunt, idoneos Sacerdotes facultatibus instructos designent, ad quos pro Sacramento Pœnitentiæ recurrere eæ facile queant.

V. Quod vero attinet ad permissionem vel prohibitionem ad sacram Synaxim accedendi, Eadem Sanctitas Sua decernit, hujusmodi permissiones vel prohibitiones dumtaxat ad Confessarium ordinarium vel extraordinarium spectare, quin Superiores ullam habeant auctoritatem hac in re sese ingerendi, excepto casu quo aliquis ex eorum subditis post ultimam Sacramentalem Confessionem Communitati scandalo fuerit, aut gravem externam culpam patraverit, donec ad Pœnitentiæ sacramentum denuo accesserit.

VI. Monentur hinc omnes, ut ad Sacram Synaxim curent diligenter se præparare et accedere diebus in propriis regulis statuis; et quoties ob fervorem et spiritualem alicujus profectum Confessarius expedire judicaverit ut frequentius accedat, id ei ab ipso Confessario permitti potest. Verum qui licentiam a Confessario obtinuerit frequentioris ac etiam quotidianæ Communionis, de hoc certiorem reddere Superiorem teneatur; quod si hic justas gravesque causas se habere reputet contra frequentiores hujusmodi Communiones, eas Confessario manifestare teneatur, cujus judicio acquiescendum omnino erit.

VII. Eadem Sanctitas Sua insuper mandat omnibus et singulis Superioribus Generalibus, Provincialibus et localibus Institutionibus de quibus supra sive virorum sive mulierum ut studiose accurateque hujus Decreti dispositiones observent, sub pœnis contra Superiores Apostolicæ Sedis mandata violantes ipso facto incurrendis.

VIII. Denique mandatur, ut præsentis Decreti ex emplaria in vernaculum sermonem versa inserantur Constitutionibus prædictorum piorum Instituorum, et saltem semel in anno, stato tempore in unaquaque Domo, sive in publica mensa, sive in Capitulo ad hoc specialiter convocato, alta et intelligibili voce legantur.

Et ita Sanctitas Sua constituit atque decrevit, contrariis quibuscumque etiam speciali et individua mentione dignis minime obstantibus.

Datum Romæ ex Secretaria momoratæ S. Congregationis Episcoporum et Regularium die 17 Decembris 1890.

I. Card. VERGA, *Præfectus*,
Fr. ALOYSIUS EPISC. CALLINICEN. *Secret.*

Romæ, mense Jan. 1891.

EX. S. CONGR. EPISC. ET REGULARIUM.

Documenta ad Decretum præcedens spectantia.

I.

Perillustris ac Reverendissime Domine uti Frater.

De mandato SS. D. N. Leonis P. P. XIII præsentibus litteris adnexum transmitto Amplitudini Tuæ Decretum, jussu ejusdem Sanctitatis Suæ ab hac Sacra Congregatione negotiis et consultationibus Episcoporum et Regularium præposita nuper latum, quo manifestatio conscientiæ, quocumque nomine veniat, omnino prohibetur, tum pro monasteriis monialium, etiam votorum solemnium tum pro Institutis votorum simplicium utriusque sexus, iis dumtaxat virorum Institutis exceptis natura ac regimine prorsus ecclesiasticis.

Declarationes insuper et dispositiones dantur de moderatione communionum, et de confessariis extraordinariis facilius concedendis.

Ad hoc autem Sanctitas Sua mihi commisit Amplitudini Tuæ, uti Metropolitæ præfatum Decretum transmittendum, ut illius exemplaria cum Episcopis ab eadem Amplitudine Tua dependentibus communicare curet; qui vicissim cum singulis Superioribus et Superiorissis Monasteriorum piarumque Domorum respectivarum dioecesum, ejusdem Decreti exemplaria communicent. Præcipit denique Sanctitas Sua omnibus locorum Ordinariis ut enunciati Decreti plenam executionem sedulo diligenter vigilare et procurare non intermittant, etiam vi specialis Apostolicæ Sedis delegationis.

Haec erant a me significanda atque declaranda Amplitudini Tuæ, cui omnia fausta deprecor a Domino.

Amplitudinis Tuæ

Addictissimus uti Frater

I. Card. Verga, *Præfectus.*

Fr. Aloysius, Episc. Call., *Secret.*

Romæ, mense Jan. 1891.

II.

Rescriptum.

Sacra Congregatio Em. ac Rev. S. R. E. Cardinalium negotiis et consultationibus Episcoporum et Regularium præposita, sequentibus dubiis propositis:

1. An Decretum incipiens *Quemadmodum* diei 17 Dec., 1890, etiam Filias Charitatis a S. Vincentio a Paula institutas comprehendat?

2. An Decretum præcitatum præter Instituta feminarum, sola virorum Instituta conditionis laicalis, uti Fratres Scholarum Christianarum etc., comprehendat, an etiam Congregationes Ecclesiasticas, veluti Salesianorum a D. Bosco fundatorum, Rosminianorum, Lazzaristarum et similium in quibus, præter sacerdotes, multi reperiuntur fratres laici?

Censuit respondendum prout rescripsit:

Ad 1.—*Affirmative* juxta modum. Modus est: Attenta peculiari Puellarum Charitatis institutione, attentisque Pontificiis declarationibus ac privilegiis indultis, præsertim a S. M. Pio VII et Leone XII, confirmatis a SS. D. N. Leone XIII die 25 Junii, 1882, publicationem et vigilantiam super executione præfati Decreti quoad dictas Puellas spectare ad Superiorem generalem pro tempore Congregationis Presbyterorum Missionis sive per se, sive per ejusdem Congregationis Visitatores, salva tamen delegatione Apostolica Ordinariorum locorum in casu negligentiæ Superiorum Congregationis Missionis.

Ad 2.—*Affirmative* ad primam partem. *Negative* ad secundam. Et facta de præmissis relatione SS. D. N. Leoni XIII in audientia habita a me Card. Præfecto die 12 Aprilis 1891, Sanctitas Sua resolutiones S. Congregationis approbavit et confirmavit. Contrariis quibuscumque non obstantibus.

Datum Romæ, ex Secretaria ejusdem S. Congr. Episcoporum et Regularium, die 15 Aprilis 1891.

I. Card Verga, *Præfectus.*

Fr. Aloysius Ep. Call., *Secretar.*

BOOK REVIEW.

MEDITATIONS ON THE PRINCIPAL TRUTHS OF RELIGION AND ON THE HIDDEN AND PUBLIC LIFE OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST. By the Most Rev. Dr. Kirby, Archb. of Ephesus, Rector of the Irish College of Rome.—Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son, 1892.

There are few of our present generation who have visited the Eternal City and not become familiar with the figure, or at least the name, of the venerable rector of the Irish College. Mgr. Kirby's love for Pius IX was a by-word with his friends, and there is something in this volume of meditations from his pen that gives a pathetic freshness to the memory of the saintly prelate's devotion to the late Pontiff, a devotion which has been transferred to Leo XIII, thus showing that it was not simply a personal love, but that it had its root in a deep attachment to the Holy See. As Superior of a seminary, he felt the need for the young ecclesiastics, of some text-book which would be useful to them in making occasional spiritual retreats by themselves. There were, of course, good books for such a purpose, but they did not in every respect fit the particular circumstances of his students. The Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius are matchless in their way, and it suited both the aim and the modest unpretentiousness of our author to adapt them for the use of the clerics in his seminary. When the labor had been half done it was suddenly interrupted by the entrance into the Holy City of the revolutionary hordes, who took Pius IX captive and upset and harrassed the colleges and seminaries. The MS. begun twenty years ago remained forgotten until within a short time. It appears that the present Primate of Ireland, Dr. Logue, had incidentally come across them when in Rome, and urged the author to publish them in spite of their incompleteness, which was finally done under modest protest from Dr. Kirby. So we have in this volume what will be to many a relic of one still living and greatly revered and loved for his sterling qualities, and especially for his loyal devotion to the Holy See, as also a book of useful and holy reflections. There are twenty-nine meditations embracing the eternal truths, the life of Christ, and the institution of the most Blessed Sacrament. The second part contains a continuous meditation in several distinct chapters on "the election of the ecclesiastical state." An appendix gives a selection of maxims and senences culled mainly from the writings of the Fathers, especially St. Jerome.

As to style and language these meditations are simple and they are direct in their appeal to the mind. The illustrations are in the main citations from the sacred text or the Fathers. For the rest the method of St. Ignatius is preserved. It seems to us that it would not be difficult to complete these meditations. With the pattern clearly given by Mgr. Kirby another trustworthy hand might be found to do in a supplement what is wanting, and thus render the work doubly valuable.

EDUCATION: TO WHOM DOES IT BELONG? A REJOINDER TO THE CIVILTA CATTOLICA. By the Rev. Thomas Bouquillon, D. D., Prof. of Moral Theol. at the Cath. University of America, Washington, D. C.—Baltimore: John Murphy & Co., 1892.

There is very little to be said about this third pamphlet of Dr. Bouquillon, so far as its contents go, on the important issue of the School question. No doubt the statements can be defended in detail; but as the whole discussion plainly shows the practical deductions (of so much laborious reasoning and even more laborious congesting of citations which can be made to suppport opposing views) turn altogether upon the meaning of words. Hence what was originally intended as a clear exposition of the Educational question from the moralist's point of view, has become a rather tangled concern requiring the addition of so much explanation that it has swelled the first pamphlet to more than thrice its bulk. That fact itself might suggest the need not so much of principles as rather of the wisdom to select and properly adjust them.

Apart from this view of it, Dr. B.'s last pamphlet as well as the second bears something of a personal character and contains remarks which cannot be justified on the "tu quoque" principle. He repudiates the idea of being called a Frenchman, as if it were impossible to become an admirer of French institutions by twenty years of sojourn under their patronage even though one's cradle had stood on Flemish ground. Similar to this in character is the note about the Germans, who, Dr. B. finds, are shy of compulsory education because it might force them to learn the English language. (p. 32.) Rather an odd bit of conclusion, for the Germans seem as a rule anxious enough to learn English, although unwilling in many cases to give up their native language as a substitute. As a matter of fact it would be difficult to find any German school where English is excluded. But these are things which in a pamphlet of this kind rather lower the position of the one serious advocate of state control in the United States, whose reputation as a professor at our University has given him a hearing where otherwise it might not have been so readily accorded As the matter now comes from him, it means nothing less than inviting the civil authorities to take control of schools which we are managing for the common good and at our own expense, as a proper and necessary annex to our religious worship. For the parochial schools, as recommended by the Holy See and our Councils, and as we have them, are nothing else than complements of the churches, with which our civil authority has no

right to meddle, unless it wish to give us back an equitable share of the taxes which are paid for that purpose. In this case the State has certainly some right in the management, but not any which will hinder the legitimate aim, or limit the proper sphere of the Parish School; that is to say, to teach religion in conjunction with secular training, or rather to use the latter as a means for the religious education of the child, which we hold to be the primary aim of life. This is the recognized position of denominational State schools in Europe, where not only the teachers are of the same religious creed as the pupils, but where the text books in use are prepared by Catholics, and religious instruction is imparted during the regular school hours. In the United States, on the contrary, the State provides nothing for the religious training of the child, and, as long as the Constitution stands, cannot legitimately do so. It excludes all religious exercise, which, as every educator of Catholic children knows, is so essentially neccessary to form the heart to the proper appreciation of the true faith; but our State system, as a rule, requires us to accept text books as well as examiners and supervisors without any regard for our religion. Under such circumstances no Catholic can accept State-control, much less advocate it, without laying himself open to the charge of bias for one reason or another in behalf of State-worship, at a sacrifice of our liberty and to the injury of our religion.

We know that Dr. B. denies that he has any special bias in behalf of the State, but his reasons and the whole method of his argument contradict this assertion. A writer in the current number of the *Lyceum*, who speaks rather favorably throughout of Dr. B.'s position, may serve us as an unprejudiced witness. *The pamphlet*, says the writer, *was evidently written with a view of placing before the Catholics of the United States the best arguments that could be brought forward in support of State-directed education.* A little before this the same writer says: *He* (Dr. Bouquillon) *devotes by far the larger portion of it* (his pamphlet) *to discussing the right, mission and authority of the State in the matter of education, and poses* (*sic!*) *as an advocate of State control over education within certain limits.* (*The Lyceum*, Jan. 15, 1892, p 83.)

Whilst it is not necessary to suppose that those who are against Dr. B. endorse every statement or consent to the various methods that have been employed in answering him, it is rather remarkable that all the leading minds and authorities on the subject of education have turned against him or his peculiar doctrine. Though the Jesuit writers who have published their views do not speak in the name of their Order, they plainly indicate what the Society of Jesus, embodying the champions of Catholic education in word and work throughout the world for the last three hundred years, holds on the subject.

Besides these, the Hierarchy, or at least and especially those more learned, who have expressly written on the subject of education, and who cannot be charged with un-American or anti-republican views, are pronounced against Dr. B.'s position, not only on the ground of Catholic principle but on that of freedom of legitimate action. It is perhaps difficult for outsiders properly to judge of this particular case in the United States, but men like Archbishop Logue of Armagh are not likely to commit themselves to

rash public utterance when they have any doubt as to the right view in such matters. The same may be said of the Roman authorities, so far as their judgment in this matter has been made known. We may here remark for the guidance of innocent Catholic journalists who reproduce *Roman* dispatches, and "communications" from the *Moniteur de Rome*, that the said journal stands in anything but good repute in Rome. It has hardly—we speak from trustworthy information—a five-hundred circulation in the Holy City, but vegetates on "foreign" subsidy, and abounds in Roman news which is evidently made to order for the purpose of creating impressions abroad as if *Rome* had *spoken*. The past history of the *Moniteur*—since the accession of Leo XIII.—is not a very edifying one. Mr. Des Houx who was dismissed from the editorship at the request of the Holy Father, afterwards wrote a scandalous book against the Roman authorities, which was placed on the Index. It is therefore something to be regretted, for our own sake as American Catholics, loyal to the Holy See not only in words but in feeling also, that the *Moniteur* undertakes to champion the work of an American Catholic Professor by giving it the place of honor—*grand Dans son genre, nidis el genre est petit*—in its issue of the 25-26 January. A few of the American Catholic papers such as the *Mirror* (Baltimore,) copied the article. We were rather surprised to see it in the *Catholic Standard*, where it must have crept in surreptitiously at least so far as approbation of its sentiments was implied, for the very same issue contains an editorial which might serve as a complete refutation of Dr. B's principles. Moreover the Archipiscopal Imprimitur and the well-known position of the respected and able editor of the *Standard* on the School question gives the lie to anything which might be clipped from the *Moniteur*, no matter how it comes into type.

But enough of this and other pamphlets which might follow. There is just the faintest appearance of the ridiculous coming to light in this accumulation of pamphlets and rejoinders.

THE STATE LAST: A Study of Dr. Bouquillon's Pamphlet: "Education; to whom does it belong?" With a Supplement reviewing Dr. Bouquillon's Rejoinder to Critics. By Rev. James Conway, S. J. Canisius College, Buffalo, N. Y.—Fr. Pustet & Co., New York and Cincinnati, 1892.

As Fr. Conway's pamphlet suggests in its title, he admits that the State may, under certain conditions, control the schools of its citizens; but he strenuously, and with much evidence of a full grasp of the principles in the case, points out that such right is secondary, exceptional and supplementary. It has no existence whilst the parent and the Church assert their claim to educate.

Although, therefore, Fr. C. at first sight seems to minimize the legitimate voice of the State in promoting the culture of its free citizens, he repudiates, in fact, only the exaggerated State-claim which Dr. B. represents. As Fr. C. is making an argument for what we believe the only safe theory